Indian Agent Gad Humphreys And The Politics Of Slave Claims On The Florida Frontier, 1822-1830 by Kokomoor, Kevin D
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
4-9-2008
Indian Agent Gad Humphreys And The Politics Of
Slave Claims On The Florida Frontier, 1822-1830
Kevin D. Kokomoor
University of South Florida
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Kokomoor, Kevin D., "Indian Agent Gad Humphreys And The Politics Of Slave Claims On The Florida Frontier, 1822-1830" (2008).
Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/342
Indian Agent Gad Humphreys And The Politics Of Slave Claims On The Florida 
Frontier, 1822-1830 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Kevin D. Kokomoor 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts  
Department of History 
College of Arts and Sciences 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Professor: John M. Belohlavek, Ph.D. 
Gary R. Mormino, Ph.D. 
Barbara Berglund, Ph.D 
      
 
 
Date of Approval: 
April 9, 2008 
 
 
 
Keywords: florida, slavery, seminole, humphreys, duval 
 
© Copyright 2008 , Kevin Kokomoor 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
List of Figures                   ii 
 
Abstract                  iii 
 
Introduction                    1 
 
Chapter One: The Natives                12 
 
Chapter Two: The Territory                21 
 
Chapter Three: The Agency                32 
 
Chapter Four:  Slave Claims                51 
 
Chapter Five:  Mrs. Cook and Mrs. Hannay              77 
 
Chapter Six:  Humphreys’ Trial               94 
 
Chapter Seven: Humphreys’ Removal            112
   
Conclusion                127 
 
Bibliography                133
    
   
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Territorial Florida                 6 
 
Figure 2. Colonial and Territorial Black Settlements            17 
 
Figure 3. Fugitive Slave Illustrations              26 
 
Figure 4. Location of the Agency              45 
 
Figure 5. Plan of the Agency House              46 
  
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
Indian Agent Gad Humphreys and the Politics of  
Slave Claims on the Florida Frontier, 1822-1830 
 
Kevin Kokomoor 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This project examines the intimate role slave claims played in the animosities 
which quickly developed from the acquisition of the Florida territory to the outbreak of 
the Second Seminole Indian War.  By focusing on the Indian Agency and its first 
administrator, Gad Humphreys, this connection is made by suggesting that the territory’s 
legislators were unwilling to allow the coexistence of Seminoles and blacks on the 
Florida frontier.  The presence of these communities threatened developing Middle 
Florida plantations with significantly increased risks of both slave runaways and 
insurrection.  In response, settlers and government officials pressed Humphreys to see not 
only that the Seminoles were pacified, but also that runaway slaves were apprehended 
and returned to their owners. 
The agent, however, held fundamentally different opinions on the subject of 
adjudicating these controversies than did the citizens under his direction, and his 
superiors in the War Department.  When Humphreys regularly supported Seminole 
claimants in the often-bitter property contests, his actions were met with the disapproval 
of his superiors—particularly Governor William Pope DuVal—who felt that his first duty 
was to ensure the development of the territory’s plantations.  The claims of Margaret 
Cook and Mary Hannay, in particular, strained these once respectful relationships to the 
 iv 
point where DuVal sought to have Humphreys removed on various charges of 
misconduct relating to his direction in the controversies.  An investigation was initiated 
into a number of allegations, yet focused on his conduct in slave controversies, and found 
that far from acting inappropriately, Humphreys had performed his duty with exceptional 
integrity.  Ultimately, however, DuVal’s effort was successful.  Humphreys was 
superceded in 1830 by John Phagan—an agent much more willing to take the harsh 
measures necessary to have the numerous slaves claimed by the territory’s citizens 
surrenders. 
 In examining the actions of Humphreys, the Indians under his charge, and the 
legislators he reported to, slave claim controversies of the 1822-1830 period clearly 
illustrate the centrality of the slavery issue on the Florida frontier, and inextricably 
connect slavery to the outbreak of the Second Seminole Indian War. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 John Mahon’s History of the Second Seminole Indian War has become, to scholars of 
both the Seminole war era and of the Florida frontier generally, the definitive, even benchmark 
study of the era.  To scholars of the conflict, especially, it has become the one by which many 
have since been measured.1    The war itself was a complex struggle; it had been waged over a 
multitude of hostilities, many of which were present in the pre-territorial period.  Yet, two of 
these—expansion and slavery—came to a head in the first decades of American government.  
And attention to the prewar period, particularly the 1820s, provides excellent insight into the 
development of those antagonisms.  Ultimately, it helps make sense of the bitter, desperate 
nature of the struggle.  Mahon recognized the critical importance of these years, and his study of 
the conflict benefited distinctly from his understanding of its intricate roots.   
 Yet, in his introduction, Mahon chose first to recognize a previous study—according to 
him, the classic.  “Represented on library shelves for 120 years,” this was Lieutenant John T. 
Sprague’s Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War, published in 1848.  “This 
book,” Mahon continued, “standing alone for more than a century, has become like a bible to 
those who bother to concern themselves with the Second Seminole War.”2  Interestingly enough, 
Sprague’s study was one of the first, but not the original study.  Myer M. Cohen’s Notices of 
East Florida and the Campaigns, and Woodburne Potter’s The War in Florida, for instance, 
                                                 
1 John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole Indian War, 1835-1842, 2nd ed. (Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press, 1985). 
2 John T. Sprague, The Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 
1848; Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964); Mahon, vii-viii. 
 2
were both published shortly after the war commenced in 1836, and provided the most recent 
coverage of the conflict and its causes.3  Nonetheless, Mahon recognized Sprague’s 1848 study 
as the most impressive contribution in the post war years—an understandable assertion.  As an 
officer who served in the Florida theatre for a number of years, to say he had an intimate 
knowledge of the conflict would be very much of an understatement.  And, as a result, his 
impressive collection of original correspondence strengthen the analysis he brings to the war’s 
causes and prosecution.  In fact, contemporary historians have continued to lean on his writings 
extensively as a legitimate source of primary evidence.4   
Still, as Mahon admitted, “Unfortunately, it is out of proportion.”5  Not enough time, for 
instance, was spent on the critical prewar years.  More importantly, the lieutenant made no effort 
to set the conflict in a broader historical context, “or to demonstrate forcefully the close 
connection between the coming of this Indian war and the general issue of Negro slavery, which 
was then the central problem of the United States.”6  This critique is powerful.   
The project that follows will attempt to heed this suggestion, and examine more closely 
the critical prewar years by illustrating the ways slavery influenced or impacted the development 
of the Florida frontier, and ultimately fomented the Second Seminole Indian War in 1836.  
Specifically, I will focus on the years immediately following the region’s acquisition by the 
United States government from Spanish colonial authorities in 1821.  Colonel Gad Humphreys, 
late of the Army, and William Pope DuVal, late from the region’s federal courts, were the 
                                                 
3 Woodburne Potter, The War in Florida (Baltimore: Lewis and Coleman, 1836; Anne Arbor, MI: University 
Microfilms, 1966); Myer M. Cohen, Notices of Florida and Campaigns (Charleston: Burgess & Honour, 1836; 
Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964) . 
4 While Sprague’s inclusion of correspondences and talks are presented as if they are verbatim reproductions, they 
are not.  Whether Sprague meant to alter or paraphrase parts of his included correspondences is not known.  Yet, 
several letters are shortened, altered, or misdated.  As a result, inclusion of his letters should be used very cautiously.  
Most are reproductions of letters found in the books of correspondences received or sent by the Office of Indian 
Affairs, and although not transcribed, offer original copies. 
5 Mahon, vii. 
6 Ibid. 
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primary players there.  Their involvement through the Indian Agency moving from 1822 to 1830 
was fundamental in developing the vast and fertile frontier the nation had just recently acquired.  
The development of this frontier, however, paralleled the development of plantation society and 
of slavery.  The Indian Agency became and increasingly powerful presence in this growth; 
slavery, as with other issues more recognizable in Indian policy, soon consumed the politics of 
the Florida frontier.  This context is an excellent example of what Mahon suggested. 
Of course, others attempted to resolve the conflict Mahon recognized in Sprague’s work.  
Joshua Reed Giddings’ The Florida Exiles and the War for Slavery was published ten years after 
Origins, for instance, in 1858.7  As far as he made slavery and the concept of a slavery-driven 
war the central themes in his argument, Giddings definitely appeared to fill that void.  
Unfortunately, Joshua Giddings was the most radical of radical Republicans; his study was 
published at the height of the Civil War build-up in 1858, and was then republished in 1863.  
Consequently, its academic value should be approached with extreme cautiousness, and his 
analysis should be viewed as little more than propaganda.  Later, Charles H. Coe’s Red Patriots: 
The Story of the Seminoles was published at the turn of the century, in 1898.8  Yet while Coe’s 
exposition does at least embrace the role of slaves in the Seminole conflict, he does so only with 
token inclusion—in the introduction and only with a passing nod to Sprague or Giddings.  Thus, 
Sprague persists.  As John Mahon implied in 1967, a more studied effort was clearly necessary.    
His own work contributed significantly to filling this omission, but still more elaboration 
was necessary.  What is more fascinating, then, is that John Mahon’s call has, for the most part, 
remained unheeded by the war’s more contemporary historians.  In the wake of Mahon’s 
History, Virginia Bergman Peters next attempted to illustrate the struggle through the lens of its 
                                                 
7 Joshua R. Giddings, The Exiles of Florida (Columbus: O., Follett, and Foster, 1858). 
8 Charles H. Coe, Red Patriots: The Story of the Seminoles (Cincinnati: Editor Publishing Company, 1898; 
Gainesville: University of Florida, 1974). 
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slave controversies in 1979, with The Florida Wars.9  Expounding heavily on the close 
association of slaves, black Seminoles, and the removal debate, and including that examination 
over generations of residence in Florida, Peters’ study would appear definitive in making the 
slavery connection Mahon suggested twelve years previous.   
However, her arguments were as forceful as they were blunt and obviously biased; sadly, 
she in no way reinforced those assertions through the primary evidence she cited.  Without any 
sort of definitive primary source documentation, much of her argument should ultimately be 
taken with little more than the cautiousness of Giddings’ study.  James Leitch Wright’s Creeks 
and Seminoles, published a year after Mahon’s revised addition came out in 1985, provides 
probably the most convincing (and most professional) elucidation of the causes behind the 
Seminole conflict to date—an analysis which adroitly considered issues of land, trade, and 
slavery as the variables which coalesced to created the Seminole conflict.10  Wright was more of 
a Creek and Seminole historian, however.  He was primarily interested in projecting their shared 
history, and did not focus his study on the development of war.   
Regardless, Wright understood blacks’ conspicuousness in Seminole, territorial Florida.  
From his study, a sort of disturbing, backwards slide began, slowly displacing slavery from the 
list of variables involved in the conflict.  Amazingly, the most recent examples of Seminole War 
scholarship have been the ones which have chosen to eschew the position of slaves in the 
Seminole removal debate most completely.  John and Mary Lou Missall’s The Seminole Wars, 
published in 2004, provides excellent evidence of this retrograde.  Their narrative gives scant 
                                                 
9 Virginia Bergman Peters, The Florida Wars (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1979). 
10 James Leitch Wright, Creeks and Seminoles (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986). 
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recognition to blacks of any relation to the Seminoles—whether slaves, maroons, or black 
Seminoles—and does so almost solely in two pages of their introduction.11 
Thus, as Sprague’s war scholarship has stood for over a century, practically on its own, 
Mahon’s study has done the same for close to half that time now.  But alas, where blacks’ 
position in the debate has flagged on the part of Seminole war scholars, it has been surging for 
some time from the direction of many of the most highly respected historians of African 
American history.  A salvo of path-breaking articles by Kenneth Wiggins Porter, consolidated 
into The Negro on the American Frontier in 1971, became the spearhead of this surge.  Since 
that time, historians such as Kevin Mulroy and Larry Eugene Rivers have furthered the study of 
Black Seminoles and slaves in the Seminole country in astonishing ways.  Rivers’ 2000 study, 
Slavery in Florida, for instance, has been recognized as a seminal study of the institution’s 
development throughout all of Florida.  His chapter on the interaction between blacks and 
Indians, most specifically, has become quite possibly the most promising study of the run-up to 
the Seminole conflict yet, expressed heavily through the lens of black participation.12   
In even the most comprehensive of these studies, however, one critical aspect of the 
conflict remains un-examined—Florida’s Seminole Indian Agency.  This federal institution 
played an irrefutable role in the territory’s development, perhaps in a way unparalleled by other 
territorial experiences.  Its position in controversies over slaves, which arose through the 1820s, 
was no less critical; its officers played an undeniable role in flaming the enmity which ultimately 
erupted into war.  Yet, as a key player in the slavery debate, the U. S. government has been  
                                                 
11 John and Mary Lou Missall, The Seminole Wars (Gainesville: The University of Florida Press, 2004), 10-12.  See 
also: James Covington, The Seminoles of Florida (Gainesville: The University of Florida Press, 1993); and Joe 
Knetsch, Florida’s Seminole Wars, 1817-1858 (Charleston: Arcadia, 2003).  
12 Kenneth Wiggins Porter, The Negro on the American Frontier (New York: Arno Press, 1971); Kevin Mulroy, 
Freedom on the Border: The Seminole Maroons in Florida, the Indian Territory, Coahuila, and Texas (Lubbock, 
TX: Texas Tech University Press, 1993); Larry Eugene Rivers, Slavery in Florida: Territorial Days to 
Emancipation (Gainesville: The University of Florida Press, 2000).  
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Figure 1.  Territorial Florida 
 
The 1820s Florida frontier was almost entirely unpopulated below Tampa Bay, where Fort Brooke was established 
to secure the southern boundary of the Seminole Nation.  The most settled towns were Pensacola on the west 
extreme of the panhandle, and St. Augustine on the east.  Tallahassee was chosen as capital not only because of its 
position between these two locations, but also because of its central location in the region’s blossoming cotton belt. 
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alarmingly absent from most studies of the larger conflict era.  As a result, an 
examination of the Agency, its experiences and its effects should most certainly further elucidate 
the role blacks played in the region’s turbulence through the 1820s and 1830s.  Territorial 
officials were forced to deal with these complaints and, unfortunately, Gad Humphreys’ agency 
became consumed by them.    
Yet, the story of Florida’s Seminole Agency and its highly conflicted position on slave 
claims began, really, with the intersection of three preceding developments.  In the first of these, 
the movement of Seminoles and blacks into the Florida territory can be seen as the result both of 
Creek autonomy and emigration, and a Spanish colonial system that enticed, liberated, and 
armed runaway slaves.  These arrangements had, by the change of flags, developed populations 
of both Seminoles and blacks along the Florida borders and into the interior; they were 
autonomous, fiercely militant, and extremely wary of Americans.  The second, conflicting 
history considers the development of middle Florida—a region blossoming into quite the cotton 
belt.  Its improvement in an Old South direction was progressing remarkably well and territorial 
legislators wanted, above all else, to promote and continue that growth.  Free black populations 
naturally threatened such development; in response, their eradication—and the Seminole 
communities that supported them—became paramount to settlers and legislators alike.   
Lastly, the Indian Office arrived.  It moved into Florida in 1821 and encountered loosely 
confederated Seminole and black settlements in alarming numbers.  Regardless, the Office 
operated by a system which had already been effectually developed in other southern nations, 
and legislators were confident that it would prevail in Florida as well.  Using an agent, the 
territorial governor, Superintendent Thomas McKenney, and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, 
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the Monroe Administration sought to pacify the Seminole bands, isolate them, and clear the 
Florida frontier for American expansion. 
Ultimately, these stories construct a very volatile Florida territory which existed by the 
early 1820s—a frontier where Gad Humphreys arrived, fresh from military service, to assume 
the Seminole Agency.  He undertook that office in a dangerous region, and was harnessed with 
the authority to see to its development.  Yet the agent soon realized that his duties included a 
considerable amount more than isolating and pacifying the Indians—orders which proved 
difficult enough to effect.  As the cohabitation of the Seminoles and blacks collided with the 
development of chattel slavery, the incidence of runaway slaves increased accordingly.  The 
business of having them returned, as with other issues relating to Indian-settler intercourse, had 
to be channeled through the Agency—through him.  It was these claims which soon became the 
greatest source of animosity between the regions’ settlers and the Indians under his control.    
Humphreys, as the sole agent, mediated a great deal of them.  So did the territory’s 
governor, William Pope DuVal, who shared in the agent’s duties and directed him as a superior 
authority.  Although they had previously worked together in placing the Seminoles on a 
reservation, sustaining them in difficult times, and mitigating their usually hazardous interaction 
with whites, they soon disagreed over slave claims.  The two had very different opinions 
regarding the ever-rankling disagreements they were forced to deal with daily, revolving around 
claims of slave property.  DuVal, importantly, shared the views of the burgeoning Democracy 
enthusiastically.  His first duty was to his fellow citizens, and to the emigrant Americans who 
wished to call the Florida frontier their home.  Humphreys, on the other hand, was a much more 
outspoken proponent of native rights, and those rights extended to the property claims for slaves.  
He recognized the liberties of the blacks as well—many who had legitimately gained their 
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freedom under Spanish rule. 
 Eventually, their disagreements over runaway slave policy became a bitter power 
struggle, which flamed into a Department-wide controversy that effectually incapacitated the 
Agency by 1830.  By that time, the governor and agent stood in belligerent contradiction to each 
other.  Soon, they were dragging Superintendent McKenney and several secretaries of war into 
an argument over the legal—even moral—justifications for demanding slaves from Indians who 
clearly felt they were being robbed.  What was soon concluded by removing Humphreys as 
agent, illustrates with striking clarity the issue of slavery as it intimately influenced the Seminole 
conflict.   
Surprisingly, Colonel Gad Humphreys and his agency are factors in the history of the 
Seminole conflict which have been largely ignored.  Sprague included a great deal of 
Humphreys’ correspondence in Florida War.  He ultimately approved of the agent’s course, and 
lamented his removal.  Generally, so did Dr. Mahon.  Even the latter study, however, failed to 
fully examine these controversies and integrate them into the larger conflict.13  Only one study 
has included such detail, and that investigation came to a conclusion—interestingly enough—
which seems to find Humphreys almost criminally culpable.  In the debate over runaways in 
Florida, George Klos argued in 1989, “the agents assigned exacerbated rather than allayed 
conflict.”  And Humphreys, in particular, was to blame.  Throughout his tenure, according to 
Klos’ argument, the agent did almost everything in his power to counteract slave owners, at least 
concerning their complaints about runaways.  Furthermore, he was trading illegally in many of 
the slaves personally.14   
                                                 
13 Sprague, 70-71; Mahon, 70-71.  See also: Giddings, 75; Peters, 86. 
14 George Klos, “Blacks and the Seminole Removal Debate, 1821-1835,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 68 (July 
1989): 63-66. 
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In the following study, Humphreys’ actions are argued to quite the opposite conclusion.  
As an agent, he developed into a champion of the Seminole Indians at a time, according to 
Mahon, when they badly needed one.15  He recognized the position of blacks in Seminole society 
with a cognizance unmatched by his superiors—whether in the governorship or in the War 
Department.  He moved time after time to shield Seminole claimants from the avariciousness of 
the territory’s settlers.  He rebuffed settlers’ repeated attempts to gain these slaves, and in doing 
so earned the widespread enmity the planters.  He also regularly challenged his superiors with a 
sometimes-surprising intensity, confronting them and the unfair practices which robbed 
Seminoles of what he viewed was their rightful property.   It was his unwillingness to defraud the 
Seminoles of their slaves, and not his own cupidity, which earned the aAgent the respect of the 
Seminoles, the condemnation of the whites in his region, and ultimately the censure of his 
superiors.   
By the time Humphreys was removed in 1830, Florida’s Seminoles and settlers had 
become true belligerents.  These animosities developed around a number of different 
discrepancies—whether over the struggle for land, food, or slaves.  But slavery was central.  Not 
even the conflict over emigration illustrates Floridians’ rapacity, the Indians’ desperate 
indignation, or even the breakdown of the region’s government, contributed as strongly to the 
controversy.  Humphreys’ tenure in the Agency from 1822 to 1830 had dramatically altered the 
course of slave claims and Seminole-settler relations by the time he was removed.  Where this 
removal would seem to prove his failure as an agent, however, I argue that Humphreys was quite 
the opposite, and that he spared Florida a bloody guerilla war, if only for six years. 
And yet the agent’s actions, those of his superiors, and of the Indians under his control, 
do a great deal more than highlight the inadequacies of the Federal Indian Office, or the cruel 
                                                 
15 Mahon, 59. 
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rapacity of frontiersmen.  They help shed light, for instance, on the relationships Indians shared 
with blacks in striking detail—relationships which enraged countless Seminoles when their 
slaves were, time and time again, stolen from them.  They also emphasize the degree in which 
those relationships outraged white settlers and the enormous pressure they exerted to have 
alleged runaways apprehended—whether rightfully or deceitfully.  These dealings had, possibly 
more than any other controversy, convinced many Floridians that removal—or war—were the 
only options.  In short, the first eight years of the Seminole Agency, and the slave claims that 
practically paralyzed it by 1830, can tell us a considerable amount about the roles blacks played 
in the larger Seminole conflict.  In an effort to help answer Dr. Mahon’s call, to “demonstrate 
forcefully the close connection between the coming of this Indian war and the general issue of 
Negro slavery,” Colonel Gad Humphreys and the politics of slave claims on the Florida frontier 
is an examination that needs to take place. 
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Chapter One 
 
The Natives 
 
 
“Before giving an account of this wanton destruction of human life,” historian Charles 
Coe suggested in 1898, “it seems an appropriate place to notice the negroes who lived among the 
Indians.”  Reasserting that centrality, another historian concluded more than a century later that 
in the “triracial Florida” world, runaways slaves rested “at the root of much of the impending 
conflict between whites and Indians,” and certainly the Seminoles.16  Connections the two 
groups shared through both the Seminole removal debate and war were ones which coalesced 
slowly in over a century of residence on the Florida frontier.  Although for separate reasons, both 
Seminoles and slaves had moved into Spanish Florida around the same time period, mostly 
during the eighteenth century.  Through their mutual struggles for existence and autonomy, by 
the territory’s acquisition in 1821, the two groups had grown extremely close, and the efforts 
begun by territorial officials to extirpate those roots soon proved painfully difficult.   
William H. Simmons, as with numerous other commentators, extensively noted the 
relationships Seminoles and their slaves shared in both the Seminole and maroon towns he 
passed through.  “The partial union of wild and social habits,” he noted, “exhibited by the Negro 
settlements, presents a very singular [anomaly], no where else, perhaps, to be met with.  The 
gentle treatment they experience from the Indians, is a very amiable trait in the character of the 
                                                 
16 Coe, 14; Rivers, 189. 
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latter.”17  They sometimes lived in Seminole towns, and sometimes in autonomous maroon 
settlements; in both cases, however, they managed their own cattle, crops, homes and personal 
affairs.  They dressed similarly, carried weapons and hunted alike as well.  In his observation, 
army officer Archibald McCall noticed their large fields “of the finest land,” which produced 
extensive crops of corn, rice and vegetables.  Slaves’ houses were well built, in some cases 
“more comfortable than those of the Indian masters.”  They rendered to their owners a tribute in 
livestock or produce, but otherwise were “free to go and come at pleasure, and in some cases are 
elevated to the position of equality with their masters.”18   
Blacks’ position within Seminole communities, another asserted, was one “compared 
with that of negroes and overseers, of luxury and ease.”  Agricultural demands never exceeded 
the “very trifling”—usually no more than ten bushels from their own crops, “the remainder being 
applied to his own profit.”19  As historian Kevin Mulroy has suggested, these tribute 
arrangements mirrored the communal agricultural mico system depended upon by Seminole and 
Creek cultures for generations.  Even its southeastern predecessor, the sabana system, bore 
striking similarities.  In these arrangements, all members of a town planted in common fields, 
and gave portions of the crop to the tribe’s chief, depending upon their individual success.   
These offerings were then stockpiled as a common surplus—subject to the chief’s discretion, yet 
usually reserved for times of need.20  The “tribute” many of these observers saw blacks paying 
                                                 
17 William H. Simmons, Notices of East Florida (Charleston: A. E. Miller, 1822; Gainesville: University of Florida 
Press, 1973), 76. 
18 William Kennedy, Texas: The Rise, Progress and Prospects of the Republic of Texas (2 vols., London: R. 
Hastings, 1841) vol. 2, 350; Simmons, 76; George A. McCall, Letters From the Frontiers (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 
1868; Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1974), 160. 
19 Potter, 45-46.  See also John Lee Williams, The Territory of Florida (New York: A. T. Goodrich, 1837: 
Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), 240. 
20 Mulroy, 7-8; Simmons, 76; Mark Van Doren, ed., The Travels of William Bartram (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1928), 400-401.  For more information on the sabana system, see Amy Turner Bushnell, “Ruling ‘the 
Republic of Indians’ in Seventeenth-Century Florida,” in Peter H. Wood, Gregory A. Waselkov, M. Thomas Hatley, 
eds., Powhatan’s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 140-142. 
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was, very likely, less consistent with a master-slave relationship than with the normal 
contribution required of any town member.21 
The Indians’ retention “of their own notions, practices, and institutions” facilitated the 
incorporation of Africans remarkably well, Mulroy noted, and those customs (including their 
economic and agricultural structures) would play heavily into their future with runaways.  Like 
other traditions, various tribes of Seminoles had also long dealt with slavery, and easily 
incorporated Africans into their institution as fugitives began trickling in from the colonies or the 
American South.  Southern Indian traditions dealt with slavery as a result of battle, however, and 
as replacements for lost relatives—either torture or adoption was the usual outcome.  Native 
customs did not associate slavery with organized labor or agricultural exploitation, as the 
institution developed in the American South.22  “It was a mutually advantageous arrangement,” 
Kenneth Wiggins Porter concluded, “in which the master furnished protection and the slave paid 
a moderate rent in kind, rather than anything even approaching the familiar system of plantation 
slavery.”23  Equality was an obtainable proposition for many held in this position.  Intermarriage 
was not prohibited, and the children of such unions, according to historian Edwin McReynolds, 
sometimes acquired complete freedom—an observation confirmed by William Bartram in the 
late eighteenth century, as well as many others.24   
In the loose confederation of bands and towns that constituted Seminole country, both 
Indians and blacks enjoyed a large amount of autonomy and cultural diversity.  It was this sort of 
independence, Mulroy concluded, which had lured many of the first Indian bands into the region 
                                                 
21 Porter, 186-187. 
22 Mulroy, 7-8, 17. 
23 Porter, 186-187. 
24 Edwin C. McReynolds, The Seminoles (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957), 74; Doren, 183.  See also, 
Coe, 14-15; James Leitch Wright, The Only Land They Knew (New York: Free Press, 1981), 261; Thomas Simpson 
Woodward, Woodward's Reminiscences of the Creek, or Muskogee Indians (Mobile, AL: Southern University Press 
for Graphics, 1965), 94. 
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in the first place.25  Creek tribes, in the lower portions of Georgia and Alabama, operated with a 
remarkable autonomy and self-government; although various bands emigrated south for various 
reasons throughout the eighteenth century, most were Creeks, and they carried their traditions 
with them.  Some were enticed south by the fertile, empty fields of north Florida.  Still more, 
however, fled to the region with the hopes of escaping the expansion of the American frontier.  
Into a “rare sort of vacuum,” as Mahon suggested, these first Indian bands relocated, prospered, 
and became Seminoles.  Their right to the Florida soil was, in essence, a consequence of both the 
struggle for empire among European colonial powers, and an aspect of Creek traditions of 
autonomy.26  By 1823, just under 5,000 Seminoles were recognized in the region.27   
Furthermore, Spanish colonial authorities, who had been bringing those settlements into 
contact with runaways through the eighteenth and even seventeenth century, fostered their 
existence.28  The first group of these fugitive slaves, fleeing from neighboring English colonies, 
reportedly arrived in St. Augustine in 1687.  As runaway incidents became more frequent, 
colonial officials repeatedly solicited the advice of the Spanish Crown, and soon a royal decree 
detailed official Spanish policy.  Florida authorities were to begin “giving liberty to all…the men 
as well as the women…so that by their example…others will do the same.”  Later decrees 
reinforced these initial guidelines, including one in 1733, which not only reiterated Spain’s offer 
for freedom, but prohibited compensation to their previous owners.  In return, the fugitives were 
required to accept the Catholic religion, and complete four years of service before the crown 
would officially grant their freedom.29 
                                                 
25 Mulroy, 7. 
26 Mahon, 2-3. 
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It became, according to one American report, a system which “combined benevolence in 
its leading principles, and that, in practice…exhibited a perpetual reciprocity of interest.”30  
While recent scholarship has examined the several degrees of freedom available in Spanish 
Florida, there is little evidence to refute the comparative liberty blacks enjoyed out of English 
colonies and, later, the American South.31  As Mulroy concluded, “Those enslaved, therefore, 
exchanged masters gladly by escaping across the border to Florida.”  In this environment, 
countless blacks were amalgamated with the Seminoles, and their coexistence in Spanish Florida 
flourished.32 
Nevertheless, the Spaniards lured both blacks and Seminoles into the territory for a 
purpose.  These policies reflected a want of security on the territory’s northern border as much as 
it illustrated the supposed grace of the Catholic Majesty.  Raids, depredations, and filibustering 
expeditions commenced by the English or Americans became a generational legacy of the 
Spanish Florida period.  A pointed attack came with the Patriot War of 1812, when Georgians 
had been for some time hoping for “a desirable pretext…to penetrate their country, and [brake] 
up the Negroe Town” at St. Augustine—“an important evil” growing under the patronage of the 
Spanish.  While the Seminoles stood to lose their land, Kevin Mulroy concluded, the blacks were 
threatened with the loss of their freedom.  “Both, therefore, were quick to answer the Spanish 
appeal.”  Their cooperation with Spanish regulars rebuffed Patriot attempts to seize Spanish East 
Florida, proving the collusion of Indian and black forces to be “altogether a formidable foe.”33 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Samuel Proctor, ed., Eighteenth Century Florida and Its Borderlands (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 
1975), 6; Coe, 16. 
30 Report of Mr. Metcalf, February 21, 1823, ASPIA 2: 409. 
31 For a detailed study of Africans in colonial Florida, see Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida. 
32 Foreman, 315, 318; See also: Mulroy, 8; Missall, 10. 
33 Mulroy, 12; Mahon, 21-22. 
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Figure 2.  Colonial and Territorial Black Settlements 
 
 
Sources:  Landers, Black Society, 236; Mahon, History; 
Mulroy, Freedom on the Border; Territorial Papers; 
American State Papers.  
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More large emigrations followed the close of the Creek War of 1813-1814 and the bitter 
loss thousands of Creeks felt at the conclusion of the treaty of Fort Jackson, which stripped them 
of upwards of twenty million acres of land.  Numerous “Red Stick” Creeks—as well as blacks—
fled south rather than submit to the terms of that accord.  Once in Florida, they too were 
considered Seminoles.  Many created their own autonomous settlements, while others simply 
integrated into the already prosperous Seminole villages.  With the influx of these Creek and 
black warrior-refugees, the militant atmosphere in the territory further thickened.34 
Considering the blacks that chose to reside by themselves, however, the years preceding 
the First Seminole War marked a growth period of impressive proportions.  With the influx of 
emigrants from Alabama and Georgia, large autonomous towns consisting of maroons and 
runaway slaves began to emerge.  For the most part these black settlements, known as maroon 
communities, were usually closely associated with a larger Seminole or Creek town, and with the 
passage of time, became large and populated themselves.  Examples of these settlements could 
be found scattered across the Peninsula: on the Suwannee, around Tallahassee and St. Augustine, 
along the St. John’s River, along the Withlacoochie River, above Tampa Bay, in the Great 
Wahoo Swamp, in the Big Cyprus Swamp, down the southwest coast of Florida and especially 
on Charlotte Harbor.35   
The frequency of runaways from these regions, the willingness of the Seminoles and 
Spanish to harbor them, and the determination of runaways’ owners in the southern states to 
regain them—or perhaps “to take advantage of the confusion and recover additional slave 
                                                 
34 Mahon, 22; Katherine E.H. Braun . “The Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery,” The Journal of Southern History 57 
(Nov 1991): 633-634; Missall, 22. 
35 Braun, 633-634; Milton Meltzer, Hunted Like a Wolf (Sarasota, FL: Pineapple Press, 2004), 52.  For an account of 
a black settlement on “Big Swamp,” see John C. Ley, Fifty-Two Years in Florida (Nashville TN, 1899), 47.  For 
information on those settlements south of Tampa Bay, see Clarence Edwin Carter, ed.  The Territorial Papers of the 
United States (Washington:  United States Government Printing Office, 1956-1962), 22: 744.  Hereafter, TP; John 
Winslett to Augustus Steele, December 21, 1833, in American State Papers: Military Affairs 6: 453.  Hereafter, 
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property,” Edwin McReynolds suggested—combined to make border diplomacy in the region 
frustratingly complicated.36  Coalescing in the destruction of the Negro Fort in 1816, and 
Andrew Jackson’s invasion in 1817-1818, depredations on behalf of angry frontiersmen often 
destroyed villages and scattered countless communities of both Seminoles and blacks.37  They 
also—in what would be a thematic trend—brought both warrior groups together over and over 
again in common defense; the threat of annihilation crystallized their alliances in permanent 
ways.  During one campaign of the 1817 invasion, for instance, over six hundred blacks were 
visible in numerous Seminole towns, seen “on parade,” in town squares, bearing arms, and “in 
complete fix for fighting” together with their Indian compatriots.38  In another, General Edmund 
P. Gaines reported to Major General Andrew Jackson on the forces opposing him in Florida, 
numbering the Indian warriors at over two thousand, “besides the blacks, amounting to near four 
hundred men, and increasing daily from Georgia.”39  During Jackson’s siege of Suwannee—a 
town which included large numbers of both blacks and Seminoles—thousands escaped only after 
a heroic defense put on by both black and Seminole warriors allowed the town to evacuate across 
the river and escape.40 
Whether linked as fellow emigrants, exiles, fugitives or warriors, both Seminoles and 
blacks were formed up by the Spanish as the first line of defense and hardened by almost 
continual struggle.  Through the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the two populations 
had soon weathered and endured, side by side, a perilous existence in north Florida.  Constant 
skirmishes had tested or weakened both the black and Seminole warriors.  Yet they persevered.  
                                                 
36 McReynolds, 74. 
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Their associations with each other grew stronger; the indignation they held towards the settlers 
on their northern borders grew more resolute.  It was when the two groups were assailed “from 
without,” Mulroy asserted, that their bonds were the strongest.41 
 In this sort of precarious position, both Seminoles and blacks prospered.  In an 1822 
survey, the Reverend Jedidiah Morse estimated their number at around five or six hundred.  Ten 
years later, Alachua county residents put their population at over eleven hundred, and Joshua 
Giddings noted that by the outbreak of the Second Seminole Indian War, the total, “including 
women and children, was not less than twelve hundred.”42   
Yet the American government, which John Mahon suggested “was to be their nemesis,” 
would not tolerate their existence.43  With the territory’s purchase, everything changed.  Most 
importantly, both black and Indian settlements were faced with the reality of an imminent, 
determined threat.  As one interested observer foreshadowed, “it is probable, that this hoard will 
be broken up by the American Government,—as their existence, in their present state, is 
incompatible with the safety and interests of the planters of Florida.44 
                                                 
41 Mulroy, 17. 
42 Morse, 311; TP 24: 643-644; Giddings, 97. 
43 Mahon, 18-19. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Territory 
 
 
As Williams Simmons’ observations implied, whether slave or free, the blacks living 
amongst the various Seminoles tribes constituted a steady threat to slavery’s existence in the 
more settled states on its northern border.  Settlers populated the region relentlessly in the wake 
of its annexation; soon, many were complaining of the loss of their slaves to Seminole raiders.  
The Indians were similarly enthusiastic in blaming American frontiersmen for slave stealing, 
among other depredations.  The frictions these mutual threats generated around the borders with 
Georgia particularly, Mahon asserted, heightened those typical of race relations on other 
territorial borders.45  It was natural, another historian has suggested, that the presence of a tribe 
of Indians, over which runaway slaves “exerted such a peculiar influence,” should rouse the 
“jealousy and enmity” of the slaveholders outside of the Florida territory in the ways they did.46 
Ultimately, the acquisition of Florida was only a matter of time.  Americans felt that 
Florida belonged in America “as a foot belongs to a leg.”47  And with its acquisition, numerous 
slaveholders must surely have breathed a collective sigh of relief.  For, although Seminoles still 
populated Florida, the threat of having their slaves escape or stolen no longer included an 
international boundary.  Under national jurisdiction, the lengths resorted to in having property 
seized must doubtless have been made less desperate or severe.  Simmons confirmed that 
confidence in 1822, explaining that in the wake of the annexation, “the Negro property, also in 
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the South, is now surrounded with greater security, and rendered less susceptible of being 
converted into a source of domestic danger.”48 
The invasions of 1816-1818—many backed by United States army participation—had 
already manifested this fear.  While most of the earlier incursions were fueled by simple 
American expansion, Kenneth Wiggins Porter suggested, another objective, “which became 
increasingly important and eventually developed into a primary purpose,” was to better 
safeguard the institution in the states by breaking up the runaway negro settlements in Florida 
which threatened it.49  A British trader in the territory—later executed for his participation—
wrote his son confirming that apprehension in 1818.  “The main drift of the Americans,” 
Alexander Arbuthnot accused, “is to destroy the black population of Suwannee.”50   
“You harbor a great number of my black people among you,” General Gaines 
admonished a Seminole Chief during one campaign into that particularly large settlement. “If 
you give me leave to go by you against them, I shall not hurt any thing belonging to you.”51  
General Jackson echoed the same sentiment in his larger 1818 campaign, explaining that “to 
chastise a savage foe, who, combined with a lawless band of negro brigands, have for some time 
past been carrying on a cruel and unprovoked war against the citizens of the United States, had 
compelled the president to direct me to march my army into Florida.”52  These incursions 
became the bulk of the First Seminole Indian War, which officially ended in May 1818.   
Certainly disrupted and many permanently displaced, the Seminole tribe suffered heavily 
from Jackson’s assault.  And yet, a second assault came with the transfer from Spain, only a few 
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years later.  The ratification of the Adams-Oñis Treaty in 1821 formally brought the territory 
under American control where, ultimately, “the slavery problem could be handled more 
easily.”53  Article six of that agreement did, on the one hand, guarantee an admittance of all the 
region’s inhabitants—regardless of race—to “the enjoyment of all privileges, rights, and 
immunities of the citizens of the United States.”  Sadly, however, as John Mahon and Larry 
Rivers have noted, that clause must have only been designed to salve the conscience of his 
Catholic Majesty, as there was almost no likelihood the Americans would honor the pledge.54 
Rather, whites took almost immediate steps in eradicating the combined threat in the 
wake of annexation.  Nervous Georgia slaveholders initiated the first of these steps, anxious to 
retrieve their numerous slaves pilfered by the Seminoles or held under Spanish protection.  They 
first accomplished this not through an agreement with the Seminoles, but through their northern 
neighbors in the Creek Nation.  Commissioners there were appointed to negotiate indemnity 
demands for slaves on behalf of Georgians, and in fairly straightforward language, they were 
informed that the treaty was to be for the benefit of the state’s citizens, “and her wishes should 
control them.”  What resulted was the Treaty of Indian Springs, concluded in January of 1821.  
With its agreement, not only did the Creek Nation surrender five million acres of land, but also 
took formal responsibility for the slaves under the control of the Seminoles; $250,000 in 
pecuniary damages were paid to the citizens of Georgia on their behalf.55   
Previous efforts had been made to wrest from the Creek Nation the numerous slaves in 
their possession, as could be seen in treaties held in August 1790 and June 1796.  By those 
agreements, their nation was required to deliver all blacks to the closest American post, or face a 
                                                 
53 Grant Foreman, Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1932), 317. 
54 Mahon, 29; Rivers, 11-12. 
55 Foreman, 317; Williams, 239; For more information on the treaty proceedings, see ASPIA 2: 252-257; Charles J. 
Kappler, LL. M, ed., Indian Treaties, 1778-1883 (New York: Interland Publishing Inc., 1973), 198. 
 24
deputation of commissioners which would enter the nation and claim “such prisoners and 
negroes” on behalf of American citizens.56  With the incorporation of the Florida territory, 
however, Georgians were anxious to retrieve the property held out of the jurisdiction of Georgia 
or the Creek Nation; a new treaty, integrating the Seminole tribe, was necessary.  With the 
fixation of blame placed upon both the Creeks and Seminoles, and their slaves indemnified, 
Georgians were thus relieved of a financial burden they had been agonizing over for more than 
thirty years.   
On the other hand, as one contemporary noted, great exertions had also been made, “to 
get the Indian negroes away, by other false claims of individuals; and under these claims,” many 
slaves were pilfered by the Georgians “by force and fraud.”57   If this had been the object in the 
past treaties attempted, then with the conclusion of the Indian Springs agreement, it had finally 
been achieved.  Not only had Georgians retrieved at least some restitution for the slaves they had 
lost among long-removed Seminole tribes, they had the pleasure of pitting the southern tribes 
against their northern brethren in the process.  Yet, would the Treaty of Indian Springs really 
quell Georgians’ interest in the slaves already indemnified, yet also being reigned under the 
control of the American government?  Collecting damages for lost slaves was a good start; 
collecting damages and recovering lost slaves, however, would prove much more profitable to 
planter interests—even if it meant defrauding the Seminoles of theirs.  They had multiple 
weapons within their control for affecting these desires.  Creek warriors were now more than 
willing to help capture slaves from their evidently delinquent cousins—especially the ones they 
had just recently paid for.  With the imposition of American jurisdiction over the territory, 
exploiting the naïve Seminoles would only be a matter of time. 
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Under the umbrella of this jurisdiction, the fertile Middle Florida region appeared much 
more attractive to a great number of Old South planters, and development of the region sped up 
considerably.  Particularly, cotton held the most promise, although sugar and tobacco also found 
limited success.58  The interior was, in Governor DuVal’s 1824 estimation, “the most valuable 
Southern country I have ever seen.”  He had no doubt that the fertile Middle region—located 
between the Suwannee and Apalachicola rivers—alone would sell for “more than the Florida 
debt.”  Planters from Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia agreed, and began moving their slaves 
and families into the province; rich plantations were soon developing across Florida’s brand new 
“black belt.”  In the decade of development proceeding from Florida’s annexation, this belt 
developed into Jackson, Gadsden, Leon, Jefferson, and Madison counties.  The great majority of 
Florida’s slaves resided here—sixty percent by 1830—and they were producing roughly 85 
percent of the territory’s cotton.  The 1830 census reveals a total population in Florida of almost 
35,000; over 15,500 were slaves, and 7,587 resided in the middle Florida region.  With the 
majority of this North Florida slaveholder class controlled by a small percentage of planters—
those who owned twenty or more slaves—soon “Piedmont and Tidewater society had come into 
being,” according to Julia Floyd Smith, making Florida’s interests akin to those of the 
neighboring Old South.59   
Yet, while North Florida held lucrative cotton growth prospects, in terms of its security 
and development, it in no way mirrored the Old South culture it emulated.  The majority of 
Florida was still an unpopulated, unbroken frontier; the possibility of achieving a successful 
escape was much more of a reality to slaves in Florida than in more settled slave states.  The  
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reality of a bloody slave uprising was just as evident to slaveholders and similarly 
unsettling.  They were removing thousands of slaves from well developed southern states 
and planting them in relatively dangerous—borderline inhospitable—frontier 
surroundings, practically surrounded by both Seminole and maroon settlements.  Facing 
this threat, territorial legislators began developing a plainly outlandish slave code, 
progressing through the 1820s with what Larry Eugene Rivers has considered “a small 
flood of repressive legislation.”  Beginning with the act “For the punishment of slaves, in 
violations of the penal laws of this territory,” any crime of capital offense resulted in 
death, while most other infractions resulted in whippings in a variety of lashes.  Of note 
in this first wave of legislation, section four called for the apprehending of runaways, 
“whereas many times, slaves run away and lie hid and lurking in swamps.”  Any slave 
away without permit, more than five miles from his owner’s plantation, would thereby be 
considered a runaway.60 
More legislation followed in 1824, 1826, 1827, 1828 and 1829, further revising 
and amending the original statutes.  In particular, the 1824, 1827 and 1828 legislative 
additions further defined and regulated the apprehension and redelivery of slaves by the 
authorities and Indian agents.  They enjoined upon agents the power to apprehend 
fugitives, yet also provided them with a five-dollar profit, per slave, on all runaways 
successfully delivered—proceeds that could be used to run the Agency.61  As with the 
original statutes, no less than thirty lashes were required for even the most trivial 
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infraction.  For the more dangerous offences, including rebellion, assault, or even theft, 
slaves were to be executed.  These statutes were in most cases oppressively severe and, in 
many others, extreme to the point of being unenforceable.  Yet, as Larry Eugene Rivers 
and Canter Brown, Jr. have argued, their harshness reflected the genuine threat posed by 
the presence of Seminoles and slaves in burgeoning Middle Florida.62 
“Nervous planters hesitated to invest in lands and slaves in so unprotected a 
situation,” Dr. Rivers has suggested.  The territory’s seemingly excessive slave 
regulations illustrated the immediate necessity planters felt in stabilizing their institutions 
and communities in the most expedient way.  Slave codes which counteracted not only 
the Spanish system of relative slave autonomy, but also limited plantation contact with 
free blacks or Seminoles, were necessary to “insure against slave flight or rebellion.”  In 
this way, both historians contend, dangerously harsh codes were written not in the desire 
to culture a prosperous plantation economy for the future, as was the case in the more 
developed Old South.  Instead, they evinced the immediate threat of slave insurrection or 
flight, which drove the demand for immediate, preemptory action.63 
Through treating with the Creeks and designing an extensive catalogue of slave 
codes, the territory’s first legislators initiated steps to both dispossess the Seminoles of 
their slaves, and minimize the interaction they shared with the region’s plantations.  The 
next logical step necessitated dealing with the Seminoles in their own right.  And here the 
worst news quickly became apparent to the Seminoles.  General Jackson, under whose 
command the most offensive of the First Seminole War invasions were conducted, was to 
be appointed acting governor.  Who else was better suited for the territory?  He knew the 
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terrain well, and his capacity “for ruthless action would be useful in stabilizing the 
situation there.”64 
Almost immediately after cession he had, along with other authorities, begun 
viewing both only the Seminole and black settlements with considerable apprehension.  
They were dangerous, they needed to be removed, and it had to happen as quickly as 
possible.65  Jackson communicated one such appraisal to the secretary of state in spring 
of 1821, as he recommended all Seminoles be immediately removed to Creek country.  
“Whatever may be the President’s instructions upon this subject shall be strictly obeyed,” 
Jackson wrote, “and likewise in relation to the negroes who have run away from the 
States & inhabit this country and are protected by the Indians.”66  Three months later, 
acting Indian Agent Jean Peñieres passed his own judgment to the newly appointed 
Jackson in his Indian report, noting that if it became necessary to use force with the 
numerous negroes present in the region, it was to be feared “that the Indians would take 
their part.”  Peñieres had no doubt that the black settlements had to go, however, “among 
whom runaway negroes will always find refuge.”67  Jackson promptly forwarded those 
observations to the secretary of war, citing also the necessity to remove the Seminoles, 
that “this must be done, or the frontier will be weakened by the Indian settlements, and be 
a perpetual [harbor] for our slaves.”  The runaways, he added, must be removed, “or 
scenes of murder and confusion will exist, and lead to unhappy consequences that cannot 
be controlled.68 
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Two years later, Commissioner James Gadsden, appointed to treat with the 
Seminoles, also warned of the necessity to have the blacks exiled.  In his observations, he 
noted that “an Indian population…connected with another class of population which will 
inevitable predominate in Florida, must necessarily add to natural weaknesses, and 
endanger the security of one of the most exposed, but important frontiers of the Union.”  
Furthermore, the Indians in the area were reportedly well connected with the Cuban 
fishermen in the area of Charlotte Harbor, and “to this cause principally has been 
ascribed the encouragement hitherto given to absconding negroes & savage depredations 
committed…”  Nothing short of a military post would be successful in stemming this 
“illicit traffic.”69  Governor Jackson again counseled the secretary of war on the situation, 
agreeing with Gadsden that troops would be immediately necessary to “overawe the 
Indians, and keep down the insurrection of the Blacks, of which there must be a large 
number in the Floridas at some future date.”70 
The territory’s earliest authorities recognized the danger posed by the presence of 
blacks in the region, and moved as quickly as possible to have them apprehended or 
removed.  Ultimately, the Treaty of Moultrie Creek, completed in September, 1823, at 
least somewhat provided for this necessity.  In that agreement, chiefs and warriors were 
directed, forthwith:    
To be active and vigilant in the preventing the retreating to, or passing through, of the 
district of country assigned to them, of any absconding slaves, or fugitives from justice; and 
further agree, to use all necessary exertions to apprehend and deliver the same to the agent, who 
shall receive orders to compensate them agreeably to the trouble and expenses incurred.71 
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 Slavery was not the only stipulation provided for in the treaty.  In fact, at article 
six, it was not near the top.  Yet, “inasmuch as the presence of fugitive slaves among 
them was one reason the white men were determined to force them out,” John Mahon 
suggested, that provision was of particular importance to the Seminoles.72  Their presence 
ran contradictory to the development of the frontier and of the plantation system which 
had, to that point, been successful in its emigration from the Old South.  The territory’s 
legislators, civil and military leaders realized the threat, and moved as quickly as possible 
to have it neutralized.   
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 If the appointment of their “old conqueror” made for a scary proposition to the 
thousands of Seminoles or blacks in the territory, and his suggestions regarding their 
removal an even more dangerous one, they must surely have found relief in October 
1821, when the General withdrew from the territory and his governorship, never to 
return.  His commission had been a sort of consolation appointment, after all, as the once 
Major General had been slated to lose his position after a drastic reorganization cut the 
army roughly in half.  On the other hand, according to both Mahon and Peters, Jackson 
seemed like the ideal candidate for the position, as he had commanded so successfully the 
1817-1818 expeditions; he was well acquainted with the country, and more importantly, 
was even more well equipped to deal with the Indian character.  He surely was not 
appreciative of his appointment, however, as he had was slow to accept his commission, 
did not assume the position for four months, and left three months later.73   
Nevertheless, shortly after the General’s withdrawal William Pope DuVal was 
commissioned to the first permanent governorship of the territory in April of 1822.  He 
also assumed the role of ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs for his territory, a 
subjoined position by virtue of his office.  The position included no extra compensation, 
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but under his control would be appointed one agent, and any number of subagents.74  
Governor DuVal was a southerner, born in Virginia in 1784, and a devout Democrat.  He 
grew up on the frontier, and spent his early years as a professional hunter before moving 
to practice law in Kentucky.  Elected as a Representative to the Thirteenth Congress in 
1813, he resumed the law in Kentucky after failing to gain reelection in 1815.  His tenure 
in Florida began as a United States judge of the East Florida district, where he was 
appointed in May of 1821.75 
 According to one historian, as a frontiersman the governor “learned not only the 
art of hunting but also the ability to handle pioneers.” In addition, James Owen Knauss 
elaborated, he became “filled with the spirit of the robust individualism of the West, the 
spirit which nurtured Andrew Jackson and so many others.”  With drive and abilities such 
as these, DuVal seemed like a fine appointee with the character necessary to govern a 
frontier such as Florida.  Yet, he was also individualistic, self-confident, and brave to the 
point of recklessness; above all, he was hot headed, and these faults at times detracted 
from his ability to lead and influence others in times of upheaval.  He was quick to blame 
others, and his emotional government many times seemed tainted by an almost personal 
enmity of his detractors—Indian or white.76   
 Under his superintendence, the Indian agency was thrust onto a volatile and 
confusing frontier in 1822.  At least with the superintendency came the framework of the 
Indian Office, which was not a new concept by that time.  The necessity of Indian agents 
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had developed steadily after the passage of the second intercourse law in 1793, which 
provided measures to civilize many of the tribes.  To aid in these endeavors, the president 
was authorized to “appoint such persons, from time to time, as temporary agents, to 
reside among the Indians, as he shall think proper.”  By the time Florida had been gained 
through annexation, according to Francis Prucha, temporary had been dropped from the 
title.  Permanent Indian agents began assignments in various tribes, and were soon 
indispensable elements in the management of Indian affairs.77 
 Agents’ positions and duties, for the most part, paralleled the development of the 
Indian intercourse laws.  They were to maintain the confidence of the Indians, as well as 
keep their interests connected to those of the United States.  In the specific cases where 
the intercourse law made those broad instructions insufficient, their duties were then 
specified, in order that both the law and peace could be maintained.  Additionally, 
subagents were also commissioned, but were usually done so in special circumstances—
sometimes as assistants to agents, sometimes to separate locations and given duties 
similar to agents.  Regardless of their position or purpose, they were accountable to the 
agent, who was in turn accountable directly to the governor.78 
Directives to the governor and agent in the dealings of Indian Affairs came 
directly from the Secretary of War and his Department until 1824, when Thomas 
McKenney was appointed to the newly created Bureau of Indian Affairs.  McKenney 
quickly referred to the Bureau as the Office of Indian Affairs, however; and from his 
position, he oversaw annuity payments, expenditures by the various agencies under the 
Department’s direction, and the claims or controversies which arose over intercourse 
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regulations.  Strangely however, McKenney’s actual status was only that of an 
administrator, and officially he lacked the authority to enforce the orders he was 
appointed to direct from his position in the War Department.  That power still lay under 
the discretion of the Secretary of War—technically, McKenney was only another clerk.   
A separate and autonomous superintendence would not pass into law until 1832.  Yet, 
while McKenney loathed his seemingly ineffective position, through the early years of 
the Florida Agency he channeled the power of the War Department through his Bureau 
with every means at his disposal and with remarkable energy.  “Tall and slender, 
outgoing but aristocratic,” McKenney became an extremely able liaison between the 
territorial Florida government and Washington; both Governor DuVal and Agent 
Humphreys respected his authority as such.79   
Where the influence of the Indian Office became insufficient, however, and 
military force became necessary, agents were supposedly provided with the authority to 
employ the assistance of nearby forces.  Commanders were often given express 
instructions to aid agents in the enforcement of their duties, Francis Paul Prucha 
maintained, and were called upon in times of true upheaval.  Sometimes this meant 
patrolling the boundaries, keeping Indians within their limits, and preventing 
confrontations.  Other times excursion parties arrested Indians or whites suspected of 
committing depredations, and helped give a sense of security to an otherwise lawless 
region.  In some instances, commanders were wary to exercise such force without explicit 
orders from their superiors in the War Department, or to take orders from civilian 
officers.  Generally, as Prucha concluded, for the most part the officers were “able and 
                                                 
79 Prucha 2: 164-165; Robert M. Kvasnicka and Herman J. Viola, The Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 
1824-1970 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 3-4. 
  
36
devoted supporters of the government and of the intercourse laws,” and provided 
invaluable assistance.80   
For a number of reasons, the case in Florida taxes this assumption distressingly.  
“The military sent to this post not being under my command,” DuVal complained to the 
Secretary in one of many crises, “and I think they should have been, were of no use, to 
me in stopping, the Indians in their course…I cannot omit to impress on you the 
importance of having a respectable force in this quarter…”81  Forces in the region—at St. 
Augustine, Pensacola, or Tampa—were too far removed from the Indian or white 
settlements, both DuVal and Humphreys consistently groused.  At the same time, a 
misunderstanding of the power vested in agents or superintendents to call regular troops 
into action was at its most painful threshold when their presence was needed most 
urgently.  A regular, powerful military presence was usually necessary, it seemed; and it 
was either never authorized, or never available. 
The other alternative—the militia—was unreliable to the point of being almost 
totally useless.  As George Bittle suggested, Florida frontiersmen were, for the most part, 
far too independent or too busy to form any trustworthy militia force.  Through the 1820s 
and 1830s the minuteman system developing in the nation remained “totally 
unorganized” in Florida.  DuVal, as territorial governor, had power to muster and direct 
any volunteer militia party as he deemed necessary.  In times of the most severe 
depredations, some of these forces came together and achieved some measure of 
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defensive success.  Usually, however, settlers ignored every federal or territorial militia 
ordinance adopted, and the men that did muster were almost completely inept.82 
In most cases, as Prucha maintained, the success of the agency was directly 
“depended upon the character of the man.”  The agent did, after all, project his power 
through the confidence of the Indians under his control, and by the authority he 
commanded over the whites in his region.  Although both McKenney and DuVal were 
empowered to give the agent advice, and although the military was available as a last 
resort, the most critical responsibilities devolved directly upon Humphreys and his 
discretion.  Acting with broadly defined powers, Indian agents became powerful men in 
Indian affairs, and it was hoped that by their personal influence alone, the conflicts 
arising between whites and natives could be resolved.83  Humphreys’ agency was no 
different. 
Once appointed, Humphreys was to report to DuVal as soon as he arrived from 
his home in Pittsfield, Massachusetts.  He would be required to report to DuVal, 
Secretary of War Calhoun instructed the Governor, “from time to time,” and keep him 
informed of anything that might be interesting relative to the Indians.  DuVal, in return, 
was required to forward what he deemed interesting onto the Department.  Moreover, the 
Secretary directed DuVal, the Florida Agency would be funded to include one agent, one 
subagent, and both were to report directly to him.84   
Humphreys, however, was not the first Indian agent to operate in the Florida 
territory.  Captain John R. Bell had been appointed acting agent in 1821 by Governor 
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DuVal, and exercised that power while a permanent commission was being readied by 
the Department.  Moreover, Jean A. Peñieres had been acting subagent in the Territory 
since 1821, and upon his death from yellow fever, Peter Pelham was appointed in his 
place in October.85  Only in May of 1822 was Gad Humphreys commissioned by 
President James Monroe to the Florida Agency, and was requested to report to the 
governor in Tallahassee.86  His commission superceded John Bell’s acting agency, which 
had evidently come as a difficult decision for the Department. 
When the appointment of the agents was made, Secretary Calhoun assured Bell, 
“I laid your name, and that of Lieutenant Col. Humphreys who was also an applicant, 
before the President for the appointment of Agent in Florida.  After due consideration, the 
President nominated Col. Humphreys.”  Both the Colonel and Captain Bell had been 
released from the army in the same reduction which trimmed General Jackson from the 
service.  As a result, however, Col. Humphreys, “and his present means of support” for 
himself and family in Massachusetts, gave him a most urgent claim “to the patronage of 
the government.”  It was, the Secretary confessed, one of the “hardest cases” of the late 
reduction.87   
The captain had recently been charged with conduct unbecoming an officer, tried 
by a general court martial, convicted, and then had the verdict overturned by the War 
Department.  Yet the selection of Humphreys over himself was not based on this incident, 
the Secretary of War consoled Bell.  In fact, the captain had been in the territory for 
almost a year as acting agent, and was considered by the Secretary in a greater capacity 
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“and experience in the affairs” of the Indians of Florida—Humphrey’s financial situation 
was simply more of a priority.  “Under this view,” the Secretary concluded, “you will see 
that the appointment of Col. Humphreys was in a degree unavoidable, and was not made 
in preference to yourself, or from any diminution in your capacity.”88 
Humphreys’ arrival, though, would not come for quite some time.  Two months 
after his commission, Secretary Calhoun addressed the agent, requesting him to “make 
immediate arrangements” for his departure to Pensacola, where “it appears that the 
presence of the Indian agent there is indispensable.”  Furthermore, the agent had not yet 
forwarded the bond required by the government for service.  “Any omission,” warned 
Calhoun, “or unreasonable delay on your part, to comply with the above order, will be 
considered as a resignation of your office,” and a replacement appointment would 
immediately be made.  Less than a month later, the Secretary reiterated the order, adding 
that if not heard from by October, the agent will have been considered as resigning his 
office.89   
Humphreys returned the Calhoun’s ultimatum in early October, assuring 
Washington that he would depart for Florida by November 18 at the latest.  “I am glad to 
hear you will be prepared to take your departure,” the Secretary replied, though he 
continued that Humphreys had better not be late, as he was scheduled to meet a 
delegation of Seminoles in St. Marks two days later.90  As that date approached, the agent 
was nowhere to be found; he missed the scheduled meeting, and was thoroughly 
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exasperating an already panicky acting Governor George Walton.  Walton had been 
frustrated multiple times over, according to John Mahon,“his nerves near the snapping 
point” on account of DuVal’s absence and an outbreak of yellow fever in Pensacola, 
which was threatening his friends and family.  The absence of the agent only 
compounded these difficulties, and Walton had absolutely no idea what the government 
was planning as far as Indian affairs.  All he knew was that a delegation of Indians had 
traveled to meet the agent at St. Marks, and when they arrived no one was there.  Only in 
late December did Humphreys appear and assume his authority.91   
The agent had certainly not impressed his superiors as far as punctuality.  
Compounding the difficulties created by his absence, the subagent Pelham fell ill while 
he was still at his home in Massachusetts.  His duties were performed by Captain Bell, 
and then assumed by Abraham Eustis in August 1822.92  In the months after his arrival, 
DuVal commissioned Horatio Dexter as subagent to the eastern Indians, in St. Augustine, 
in an effort to alleviate the burden placed on Humphreys, who had finally arrived and was 
presently in St. Marks.  A year later, Owen Marsh was commissioned subagent in 
addition.  Beginning in 1824, after a full two years of considerable chaos, the Seminole 
Agency was finally taking form.93  
With a subagent now in the area of east Florida, Humphreys could focus most of 
his attention at St. Marks and the Indian affairs of that region.  His post was selected 
because of its relative centrality to many of the Seminole chiefs, and acting Governor 
                                                 
91 Ibid.; Acting Governor Walton to the Secretary of War, December 8, 1822, ibid.: 577; Acting Governor 
Walton to the Secretary of War, January 9, 1823, ibid.: 598; Mahon, 37-38. 
92 Secretary of War to Peter Pelham, June 24, 1822, TP 22: 474; Secretary of War to Abraham Eustis, 
August 21, 1822, ibid.:, 513; Abraham Eustis to Peter Pelham, July 21, 1822, ibid.: 498. 
93 DuVal to Horatio S. Dexter, May 10, 1823, ibid.: 681; Calhoun to DuVal, August 17, 1824, in Letters 
Sent by the Office Indian Affairs, 1824-1882, record group 75, microcopy 21, roll 1, page 181.  Hereafter, 
LS OIA; McKenney to DuVal, February 21, 1825, ibid.: 361; McKenney to DuVal, February 22, 1825, 
ibid.: 365. 
  
41
Walton directed him there upon his arrival in December 1823.94  Regardless of Dexter’s 
position near St. Augustine, however, Humphreys’ duties also required periodic 
presences there, in Pensacola, Central Florida, and even Tampa at times; the agent 
traveled constantly.  He was directed to St. Augustine by the Secretary of War in June 
1823, for instance, to help assist with the Treaty of Moultrie Creek, which was to take 
place in September.  Humphreys had requested a leave of absence to visit north, but 
Calhoun denied his application, noting that until the treaty was signed, “your services are 
considered indispensable.”  In order to best aid the treaty commissioners, Calhoun 
concluded, “you will repair to St. Augustine where you will be stationed until further 
orders.”95   
For the first few years of the Seminole Agency, all Humphreys could do was 
shuttle himself among these places, as an actual Agency house did not yet exist.  Its 
location had to be on or near the Indian boundary so as to effectually control their 
intercourse and keep up normal communications.  Until a treaty had been finalized, and 
the survey of a reservation boundary completed, acting Governor Walton had advised 
Humphreys, it would be impracticable to begin designing or building one.96  Shortly after 
the close of the treaty, however, such terms had been met, and Governor DuVal wasted 
no time in asking the Secretary for directions in constructing the establishment.  “The 
necessity of the Agent of Indian Affairs, speedily making his establishment, and taking 
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up his residence in the Country allotted to the Florida Indians, will readily occur to you,” 
the governor asserted.  He was “unacquainted with the usual practice” of the department 
in commencing with the business, however, although he supposed the buildings should be 
funded by the department as the Indian officials were not paid near enough to afford 
building anything.97 
Almost a year later, however, by November 1824, no satisfactory progress had 
been made in the establishment of the house.  DuVal directed Humphreys “forthwith” to 
select a site near the center of the Indian population, and on as good of land and water as 
could be found.98  Nothing respectable appeared, however, and Humphreys was forced to 
again wait until the northern boundary had been raised to include a large hammock area 
known as the Big Swamp.  In early 1825, the boundary line had been formally altered, 
and the agent again got the go-ahead to select a site.  Superintendent McKenney wrote 
DuVal to direct Humphreys in that endeavor, “about which it appears owing to a want of 
a salubrious spot within the hitherto ceded limits, he found some difficulty.”  A site 
picked, and layout generated, the agent forwarded his plans to the department in 
September 1825.  The location, Humphreys argued, “appears most valuable and 
important” for the purpose of the Agency.  It was located “in the direct line of 
communication” between the whites and Indians of the region, and thus gave, “in an 
extensive degree, the power to regulate and [control] the intercourse between them.”99   
At a price of five thousand dollars, the plan would cost the department over 
double its usual allowance—a cost McKenney replied was totally inadmissible.  “The 
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maximum allowance for a building, council house, and all necessary appendages, cannot 
be permitted to exceed two thousand dollars.”100  The governor relayed that news to the 
agent, but also replied to McKenney that nothing was more difficult “than to procure 
working hands” in their area, and to get them all the way out to the Agency was going to 
be expensive.  Two thousand dollars would not complete even the buildings “absolutely 
necessary for the Agency.”  When the “unusual [expense], in a remote situation, in a 
Southern and interior” region was factored in to the Agency’s construction, added 
compensation would be necessary, even to put up the most “rude buildings.”101   
Eventually, the Agency was successfully constructed with DuVal’s help, and General 
Duncan Clinch recognized the necessity of establishing a military presence in the area.  
He dispatched two companies from Fort Brooke, in Tampa, to the site, and ordered the 
erection of a fortification approximately a quarter of a mile from the Agency house.  
Under the command of Lieutenant J. M. Glassell, construction of Cantonment King 
began late in March, 1827, and was finished soon after.102 
DuVal’s assistance with the agent in the building of the Agency evinced the 
governor’s early confidence in the government’s selection.  The Moultrie Creek 
commissioners, one of whom was the governor, further commended the agent on his 
abilities during the treaty negotiations in late 1823, where Humphreys rendered them 
“essential services during the complicated difficulties” encountered.103  Yet, in fall of 
1824, when it came time to begin transferring large numbers of Seminoles to their 
                                                 
100 McKenney to DuVal, November 12, 1825, ibid.: 355. 
101 DuVal to McKenney, January 23, 1826, ibid.: 423; DuVal to McKenney, March 2, 1826, ibid.: 452-453. 
102 Mahon, 66. 
103 Indian Commissioners to the Secretary of War, September 26, 1823, TP 22: 751. 
  
44
Central Florida reservation lands, Humphreys was nowhere to be found.  He had left to 
visit his family in New England, without properly alerting the DuVal.104   
“I am directed by the Secretary of War to direct you to report yourself,” McKenney 
admonished Humphreys in October, “with as little delay as possible to [Governor] 
DuVal, and resume forthwith the duties of your agency.”  The Secretary threatened him 
personally less than a month later, reminding him that “the public service has for some 
time required your presence at your agency.” If he had net yet left Pittsfield, Calhoun 
directed, he was thereby required to leave immediately.  “Any further delay will be 
viewed, by the President, in the light of a resignation.”105  Luckily, Humphreys was 
already on his way back when Calhoun’s letter reached Massachusetts, and upon his 
return, the governor’s complaints quieted.106 
A great deal of friction continued in the proceeding year, however.  A severe 
drought and other complications concerning the Seminole’s first season in their new 
reservation nearly resulted in war; in the panic, the governor lost his temper.  Humphreys 
returned to his Agency late in the spring of 1825 from his absence and arrived to witness 
the Seminole emigrants in extreme destitution.  The recent drought “has been so severe 
that the crops of the Indians are, in some instances, wholly destroyed,” he observed.  The 
recently relocated Seminoles would be the hardest hit, as they had just begun planting 
new fields, and had no other subsistence to rely on.  “I am greatly apprehensive,” he 
feared, “that this failure of crops will produce much distress among these people” unless  
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Figure 4.  Location of the Agency  
 
This map of government land included the location of the Agency at the bottom right of a surveyed, 1000-
acre parcel.  It was advantageously located on roads connecting Tampa Bay, the St. John’s River, Alachua, 
and several large Indian towns.  Also located near Silver Springs and close to the Ocklawaha River, the 
Agency appeared impressively positioned on the edge of the reservation.  Taken from Territorial Papers. 
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Figure 5.  Plan of the Agency House 
 
This survey of the Agency house included a scaled floor plan and frontal view.  The building was very 
spacious at over sixty feet square; it included four large meeting rooms, wide hallways, and large porches.  
For its isolated location, the Agency was a very impressive structure.  Taken from Knetsch, Florida’s 
Seminole Wars, 1817-1858. 
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plans were made to provision them above what had been authorized by the Department.  
It would probably not be a permanent necessity, he alerted McKenney, “but humanity 
seems to require, that some provision should be made to meet the cases of actual 
want.”107 
The emigrating Seminoles were allowed up to one thousand rations per day by the 
Treaty of Moultrie Creek.  In consideration of the recent drought, however, Humphreys 
asserted to acting Governor Walton that the number had to be increased.  One ration per 
day per Indian was Humphrey’s solution, and he immediately began authorizing 
additional orders to be supplied at depots on Tampa Bay and the St. John’s River.108  
Walton, who was again filling in for DuVal while he visited Kentucky, evidently 
misunderstood the crisis, and did not agree with the agent’s actions.  The issue of rations 
had “greatly exceeded” the number which, even in the most extreme case, had been 
calculated by the Department for the Indians.  Over eighteen hundred rations were being 
distributed each day, he added—almost double the stipulated thousand.109 
Upon DuVal’s return late in 1825, the governor seemed almost insulted by the 
developments.  “The arrangement which I had made…were ample.”  He was “impressed, 
strongly and confidently, that no want of provisions would be felt by the Indians entitled 
under the treaty to draw rations.”  The agent’s directions had simply “not been attended 
to.”  Under no condition, he fumed, “was the agent to issue more rations than had been 
specifically contracted for,” and Humphreys had evidently disregarded that order 
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completely.110  “The responsibility which the Agent, Colonel Humphreys, has thrown 
upon me, by not conforming to my instructions,” he complained directly to Secretary of 
War James Barbour, “has not only surprised me, but has seriously deranged my whole 
plan for the government of the Indians in this quarter.”111  DuVal was losing his temper 
with Humphreys over his over-issue of rations, and lashed out at actions he considered a 
direct disobedience to both McKenney and the Secretary of War’s direct orders.  The 
Department wanted to know what happened, and soon McKenney ordered an 
investigation into the affair, including the agent’s over-issue of rations, as well as his 
seemingly willful allowance of the Indians to roam outside of their border.  Should the 
agent’s actions be concluded as “indispensable,” McKenney directed DuVal, he was 
directed to pay for the rations, and make their allowance possible in the future on the 
same principle.112   
The time allowed for the investigation must have given DuVal the chance to cool 
down.  When he completed his inquiry, the governor had completely reversed his 
judgment of Humphreys’ conduct.  The drought, he began, had caused a larger number of 
Indians to apply for rations than the Department had calculated.  As more Indians 
appeared, the number of rations simply fell short.  As a result, Humphreys over-issued 
above what the Department authorized, and allowed the Indians out of their boundary to 
scrounge for food.  “I am perfectly satisfied that the agent has acted properly in this 
manner,” DuVal concluded, “as he apprized the acting governor that large issues had 
become necessary, after the back rations had become exhausted.”  So far from censuring 
him, the governor felt confident that Humphreys had simply discharged his duty.  “I 
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approve of his conduct, and regret that justice should, for a moment, have detracted from 
his services and merit.”113 
DuVal had finished his investigation by commending the agent for his faithful 
service.  Yet, the depth of the governor’s unhappiness with Humphreys in the early weeks 
of the crisis was surprising.  DuVal had illustrated his tendency for hot-headedness, and 
his temper had flared startlingly when confronted with Humphreys’ perceived 
insubordination.  Deflecting responsibility not only from the agent, but from himself, 
DuVal later confided to McKenney that there were settlers who had remonstrated against 
the agent loudly during the confrontation—actions “calculated to injure the character of 
the agent, Colonel Humphreys.”  Those “clandestine attempts,” were the real culprit in 
the controversy that ensued—not his overreaction.  Luckily, DuVal assured the 
Department, he felt assured that those animadversions had “no influence on your 
department.”  There was much “restless disposition in all new countries to interfere and 
direct the conduct of the officers of Government,” he earlier wrote, “and so strong a 
temper to complain” which came on the part of interested frontiersmen in the region.114   
These frontiersmen had evidently been affronted by the agent’s actions in saving 
the Indians from starvation, and the region from war.  The Indians knew it, and thanked 
him in a statement of their own.  As John Mahon has argued, “If in 1824 Gad Humphreys 
had been inattentive to duty,” he later began to make up for it through these tough times.  
It the disagreements between the Indians and the whites preceding the emigration crisis, 
“bit by bit he began to emerge as a champion of the Indians.”115  In 1827, still dealing 
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with accusations stemming from his early government of the Indians, he confronted a 
grand jury investigation in St. Augustine.  “I shall,” he began, “as I have ever made a 
point to do, act honestly but independently, regardless of the interested murmurings and 
calumnies of the malevolent and discontented spirits of the land.”  The territory was filled 
with “reckless adventurers from all quarters of the globe,” he retorted, and actions 
designed to protect the Indians would surely make him the “object of vituperative assault; 
but for these I care not, so long as I am sustained by a consciousness of my own rectitude 
of purpose.”  Humphreys had, he proclaimed, chosen for himself a line of conduct “from 
which I have never wittingly deviated—one, to be sure, that has given me much 
difficulty, and subjected me to severe and illiberal animadversions, but one which will 
nevertheless, I feel a comforting certainty, eventually bear me triumphantly through the 
trying ordeal of public opinion.”116 
The agent’s campaign against his “reckless adventurer” detractors proved 
effective—he was never threatened with removal.  Yet, while his decisions had 
won him the respect of the Indians under his control, they had certainly not won 
him the respect of many Floridians.  The worst fight, one building slowly through 
his earliest years at the agency, was soon to mirror that unhappiness to a much 
more extreme degree. The emigration and ration crises had illustrated the agent’s 
conscientiousness, but also his hardheadedness.  It had also taxed his relationship 
with the department and with a number of influential citizens.  It put him at odds 
with the DuVal, most importantly, and succeeded in unleashing the governor’s 
hotheaded, volatile personality.  Slave claims would soon bring out the worst in 
the agent, the worst in the governor, and the worst in the territory. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Slave Claims 
 
 
 Another difficulty in the territory, Lieutenant Sprague noted early in Origin, 
increased “from day to day, and which ultimately led to open rupture”—that difficulty 
was the emerging controversy over runaway slave claims.  Sprague noted the emergence 
of that controversy heavily in the pre-war chapters of his study.  As Mahon suggested, he 
underrepresented many of the struggles, and especially the slavery controversies.  That 
maybe true.  Yet, the time he did spend discussing the years 1821-1834 was dictated by 
the story of Gad Humphreys—the story of slave claims.  And Sprague examined that 
difficulty with a pointed suspicion.   
Regardless of their degree of bondage, the Indians certainly held slaves.  
Eventually, a primary source of enmity quickly sprung from their naiveté in that position, 
when juxtaposed against slaveholders and a new American jurisdiction; they simply did 
not understand the legal system in which they now existed. “Here was a splendid 
opportunity for white men,” Sprague charged, “greedy to acquire able-bodied slaves, to 
make extravagant claims.”  Efforts were made to take these slaves by force—legally, or 
otherwise.117   
Attempts had, after all, proven effective in the years before Florida had been 
acquired.  The spectacularly violent destruction of Negro fort in 1816 produced a small 
number of slaves, and Jackson’s First Seminole War advance on the town of Suwannee 
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threatened a large number of black families, who only narrowly escaped.118  In addition, 
very shortly before the territory’s change of flags, a major expedition of Creek and 
Coweta warriors penetrated deep into the peninsula, striking black settlements around 
Tampa Bay and farther south.  Hundreds of slaves were reportedly captured and whisked 
out of the territory for sale.  The raiding party was over two hundred strong on Tampa 
Bay alone, taking from that place “about 120 Negroes[,] after destroying four Spanish 
settlements.”119 
After Florida became an American territory, these efforts for the most part ceased; 
slaveholders rejoiced in the movement of jurisprudence into their region.  Soon, 
numerous citizens began petitioning territorial officials, who had taken the preliminarily 
steps necessary in having once lost property returned.  Marshal James Forbes, for 
instance, informed Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in July of 1821 that a Georgia 
man had recently arrived in St. Augustine.  This particular slaveholder was attempting to 
prove his ownership of a runaway slave boy freed by a Spanish court shortly before the 
cession.  In the spirited controversy that followed, however, the case was twice 
adjourned, “at which violent arguments were held” and a further recess taken.  Two 
weeks later, Forbes reported back that the case was still in suspense “by the conduct of 
the citizen of Georgia,” whose actions, the Marshal added, had been “highly disgraceful 
and reprehensible.”120   
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Numerous other slaves were being held in St. Augustine’s recently renamed Fort 
Marion.  Notice of their capture was posted in local newspapers and prospective owners 
were encouraged to come forward and prove their right of property—a directive 
presaging the legal precedent set in 1824 by the Acts of the Legislative Council, which 
mandated the practice with all runaways.  Should they remain unclaimed, they were to be 
sold to pay public expenses.  In a similar confrontation over these slaves, a John M. 
Carter approached authorities to obtain an entire family being held there, including 
children.  While a military tribunal investigated the case, however, he evidently grew 
impatient and attempted to carry the slaves off forcibly.  In what resulted, Carter 
“subjected himself to an arrest,” was released on his own recognizance, and was required 
to attend a criminal court hearing “to answer for the offence.”121 
The desire for slaves was bringing out the worst in the region’s slaveholders, no 
doubt anxious to get their hands on valuable property, which had just recently become 
much more available.  As the Indian Agency became established, these efforts were 
increasingly channeled through its agents and the governor/superintendent.  Secretary of 
War John C. Calhoun first directed Indian agent John Bell in his roll, notifying the 
captain that the government expected all the slaves who had run away, “or been 
plundered from our citizens or from Indian tribes within our limits,” would be given up 
peaceably by the Seminoles.  They would do so when demanded by him, and after he had 
received sufficient proof of the claim’s justice.122   
Provisional agents, like Bell, were appointed on an irregular basis—when 
required to regulate trade between the area’s settlers and Seminoles in the earlier years, 
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and before permanent positions were created.  Quickly, however, they were pressed by 
aggressive frontiersmen to issue trading licenses, many for the purpose of buying Indian 
slaves.  Considerable anxiety existed in the territory, subagent Abraham Eustis wrote the 
Secretary in 1822, on behalf of a large number of citizens who urgently desired the ability 
to trade in Indian settlements.  Several had already applied to him for these rights, 
ostensibly for various trading purposes.  Eustis immediately recognized that many were 
interested primarily in slaves, and the subagent was unsure whether to grant requests 
under these pretenses or not.  In asking Calhoun for directions, he wondered if these men 
should be allowed the right at all—“If yea, under what restrictions?”  He also enquired as 
to whether contracts over slaves made before the transfer, “which have not been yet paid 
for, or delivered,” could now be completed.123 
Whether Secretary Calhoun directly responded is unknown.  In July 1822, 
however, one of Governor DuVal’s first acts in office answered the subagent’s queries 
definitively, proclaiming that “no person or persons shall be permitted to purchase of an 
Indian residing in the Territory any cattle, hogs, horses or slaves,” unless by the express 
permission of Col. Humphreys, himself, or the president.  Clearly evincing his early 
consideration for the sovereignty and property rights of the Seminoles, DuVal worded his 
proclamation sternly.  Those violating the trade or intercourse laws were subject to arrest 
and prosecution.  It also forbid settling in or close around Indian settlements, and anyone 
found there would be “liable to be removed by military force.”  The moratorium, agent 
Eustis confided to the governor two months later, would without a doubt preempt such 
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“unlicensed trade.”124    DuVal updated his decree less than a year later, proclaiming all 
licenses issued by acting agents up to that date “to be null and of no avail.”   Once again, 
the governor forbid “any person or persons whatsoever from trading with any Indian” 
within the territory, without a license issued directly by either agent Humphreys or 
himself.125 
With aggressive frontiersmen effectually held at bay by late 1822—denied the 
ability to acquire slaves through legal trade—DuVal first turned his attention to their 
allegations, and confronted a delegation of chiefs on the subject of runaways in July.  If 
he had illustrated his concern for the Seminoles’ rights in slaves, he soon clarified his 
support for the claims of the settlers to many of them. “If you Chiefs will have all the 
slaves belonging to the white men who have run away to Florida brought to the post of 
St. Marks,” he offered, “you shall have what is right.”  DuVal promised to reimburse the 
chiefs for their “time and trouble.”126  Calm and obliging, he must have anticipated little 
agitation over the subject. 
As the Treaty of Moultrie Creek concluded in 1823, government focus shifted 
away from intercourse and trade, and dealt primarily with readying thousands of 
Seminoles for their trek deep into the peninsula and onto a newly surveyed track of 
land.127  Consequently, the subject of slavery was not given much notice, and DuVal’s 
next report came more than a year later.  His previous talk evidently had not produced the 
participation he expected, however, and runaway claims were lately coming in with more 
frequency.  Writing to Secretary Calhoun, DuVal alerted Washington of this distressing 
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development, noting that the territory’s citizens had numerous slaves “running at large” 
in the region, and he appealed to Calhoun to converse with the president over the subject.  
Moreover, the territory lacked a sufficient force to have them apprehended.  The force 
that was available was not even under his or the agent’s control.  Owners “continually 
solicit me to send a force to take them,” he complained, yet a military command was 
necessary, and he had none.   His position as ex-officio superintendent did not allow him 
control over army regulars for use in Indian affairs.  Without that ability, and unable to 
provide for militiamen should they even be authorized, he continued, neither he nor the 
agent was able to comply with their constituents’ wishes.  He recommended a force of 
fifty or sixty mounted militia, at least, to be placed under Col. Humphreys’ command 
near the Agency, along with “such Indian force as may be deemed necessary.”  That 
detachment could then be sent into south Florida, he continued, and directed to disburse 
the large settlements of blacks along the southwest Florida coast (most likely those on 
Charlotte Harbor), apprehending as many fugitives as possible.  He hoped the president 
would see “the importance of authorizing me to act speedily” in arresting the fugitives—
not only because their presence was dangerous, but also because he could do nothing 
about it.128 
The use of force in issues like these and in future cases was a particularly sore 
point for both for the governor and Agent Humphreys.  Continually they were pressed by 
settlers to have military deputations enforce their demands, whether relative to 
controlling the Indians within their limits, or having runaways forcibly seized.  In 1824, 
Colonel George Mercer Brooke moved four companies from Pensacola to Tampa Bay to 
secure the southern boundary of the treaty lands and established a permanent, sizable 
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military presence there.  Citizens felt secured by these forces, yet they blamed both 
DuVal and Humphreys when the regulars there were not employed in having disputes 
solved.  That was not in his power, the governor complained; he could only request 
Colonel Brooke for troops—he could not order them.129   
The same conditions applied in 1827, when Lieutenant J. M. Glassell marched 
two companies from Fort Brooke to the Agency and established Fort King.  As with 
Brooke’s command, Lieutenant’s Glassell’s force was doubtless designed primarily to 
assist the Agency in policing the Indians.  Still, Fort King’s troops had to be ordered 
through Glassell, and through the War Department, not directly through a civilian officer 
such as DuVal or Humphreys.  Moreover, with militia usefulness being considered “more 
of a troublemaker than a fighting force,” as Mahon suggested, and with DuVal’s inability 
to sustain or compensate them, there was almost no incentive to have them organized.130 
Complaints from citizens, however, continued to solicit such authority.  In an 
October 1823 petition to the president, a number of residents soon made the request 
direct.  While Florida was under Spanish control, they explained, the peninsula was a 
veritable haven for fugitive slaves from both South Carolina and Georgia.  These 
planters’ slaves had been lured there and protected by both the Indians and the Spanish, 
“so that from the date of the Revolution up to the change of flags, it has been utterly 
impossible for your petitioners, and other sufferers, to reclaim their property.”  To make 
matters worse, many of the petitioners had located their fugitive slaves, yet were unable 
to retrieve them—a result of the regulations designed to restrain their trading with the 
Indians and enforced by the Indian Agency.  To “arrest these inconveniences,” the 
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petitioners called on the president directly to “exert his ample power” and restore to the 
citizens their “long [deferred] rights.”  If the governor was to be given power to 
investigate their claims, for instance, and a tribunal erected to “test the right of property,” 
the redress which so many citizens were searching for, to their “long and continued 
wrongs,” might be secured.131  
The secretary of war answered the petitioners a month later, lamenting however 
that the property they spoke of was within the possession of the Indians when the 
territory was acquired.  The Department did not know enough about the existence of 
runaways and their numbers, nor the relation in which they stood to the Indians.  As a 
result, the commissioners made no real provision in the treaty for their surrender when it 
was concluded in 1823.  Furthermore, the secretary wrote, the president simply did not 
have the authority to establish the suggested tribunal without such an agreement.  
Asserting Washington’s reluctance to force compliance in such matters, the secretary 
informed the citizens that they could only petition Congress, who the secretary had no 
doubt, would “promptly attend” any request made on the subject.132 
Many of the memorialists did just that.  Six months after their first attempt, 
several petitioned Congress.  In more explicit terms, they complained that “before the 
cession of Florida to the United States, the Indians within the limits of the 
Territory…were in the constant habit of stealing, or enticing away the slaves of the 
people of Florida, as well as those of the adjacent states.”  When the change of flags took 
place, when the petitioners “were admitted to the protection of the laws of a powerful and 
wise government,” they “flattered themselves, that their property would no longer be held 
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from, but the Indians would be compelled to surrender to their proper owners the 
runaways among them.”  As yet, however, “the hope of your memorialists has not been 
realized.” 133   
The commissioners were unable to include the restoration of slave property as a 
provision of the Treaty of Moultrie Creek.  And without a clear provision, there evidently 
was no foundation for military coercion.  Without this military force, Agent Humphreys 
had declared himself both unable and unwilling to interfere.  A special tribunal was 
necessary, they again concluded, but they would welcome anything else Congress “may 
deem expedient” to remedy the situation.134 
In a correspondence which illustrates these early difficulties, Humphreys had 
previously explained to a Georgian, John McIntosh, his inability to assist in the man’s 
claim.  McIntosh had written the agent in 1824, requesting aid to remove his slaves from 
the Indians.  Instead, Humphreys answered that he had not yet been issued any specific 
instructions relative to the runaway issue, “but to adopt as practicable means to prevent 
their further escape or removal until the question of ownership be fully decided.”  
Humphreys admitted that the government’s future role in such cases would be 
“impossible for me to say,” but that he would forward the request to Governor DuVal for 
his consideration.  McIntosh had heard nothing from the agent in some time, however, 
and pleaded his case directly to Secretary Calhoun.  He had located his runaways, and 
had actually traveled into Florida to have them returned.  He failed in that endeavor, 
however, “there appearing to be no authority in the country vested with powers from the 
General Government” to enforce his requests.  “I beg leave to…sincerely hope that the 
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government will speedily adopt some rule of identity by which the property may be 
rescued,” he further chided the Department, “before it is to late.”135    
Superintendent McKenney received the man’s letter through the secretary of war 
in early 1825.  He wrote Governor DuVal in response, though he echoed in it 
Humphreys’ admissions that the government had “no power to adopt a rule of identity by 
which the property may be recovered.”  Without any provision in the treaty, all the 
Department could do was direct DuVal to “afford every possible facility to Mr. McIntosh 
to enable him to identify his property—which may serve him whenever Congress may 
adopt a provision for its restoration.”  The effectiveness of the Agency with directives 
such as these would be negligible at best.136 
Later that year, while DuVal was away on leave, acting Governor Walton 
received numerous claims, and evidently also more of the same orders from the war 
department concerning them.  He relayed those to Humphreys in May, including “letters 
from individual claimants.”  As with Governor DuVal’s order, Humphreys was directed 
to assist claimants in any way possible.  For Humphreys, that meant enabling the 
claimants, as best he could, to identify their property.  Continuing with somewhat more 
positive instructions, however, in all cases where the “validity of the claim is clearly 
established, and no other obstacle arises to prevent it,” Humphreys was to seize the slave 
and have him/her delivered to the proper owner immediately.  Any sort of trial in these 
circumstances would not be necessary.  “Let the chiefs distinctly understand,” Walton 
added, “that they are not to harbor runaway negroes, and that they will be required to give 
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up such negroes as are now residing within their limits.”137  In addition, agents for the 
Creek Nation were pushing Humphreys to deliver their slaves as well.  Owen Marsh, then 
the subagent appointed under him, was ordered to the Creek Agency in Georgia in June 
1825 to litigate one claim in particular, in a dispute between a Creek and a Seminole 
tribesman.138    
Superintendent McKenney, unsatisfied with the results of the directives outlined 
in his February 1825 letter to Governor DuVal, wrote Humphreys again a year later.   He 
directed the agent to immediately report the number of runaways in the nation, and to 
take immediate stops “to restore them to their owners.”139  The newly appointed secretary 
of war, James Barbour, had evidently decided to adopt a more assertive role in claims.  
Humphreys was to project as much authority as possible to influence the chiefs in this 
manner, as McKenney had earlier directed DuVal.  The combined petitions of Middle 
Florida planters, as well as John McIntosh’s requests, had finally elicited some sort of 
response from the Department, however vague its orders might have been.140  Still, the 
military forces at Fort Brooke, St. Augustine or Pensacola were not under their direct 
control.   
McKenney’s directive never reached the agent, as he had gone north on leave.  
Subagent Owen Marsh instead responded that any sort of accurate count would be 
impossible to attain, “from the circumstance of their being protected by the Indian 
Negroes.”  Marsh had traveled to several villages for this purpose, but could not find any 
blacks who he could positively identify as runaway slaves.  They were being hidden by 
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the more settled Indian Negroes, he concluded, who were “so artful, that it is impossible 
to gain any information relating to such property from them.”141 
Secretary Barbour had also forwarded McKenney’s correspondence with 
Humphreys to Florida’s territorial delegate in the House of Representatives, Colonel 
Joseph White.  “The order you have issued will not obtain the object,” White returned to 
McKenney in March 1826.  “The quo modo must be pointed out, and strict and minute 
instructions issued to the Agent.”  White included letters from a Superior Court Judge 
and an attorney in the Legislative Council, outlining some possible steps in proving 
ownership.  McKenney responded to the suggestions by acknowledging “the necessity of 
giving additional and more spirited instructions to the Agent in regard to the delivery of 
the Slaves, &c.”  Should his general order to Humphreys “fail of its object,” he assured 
White, his suggestions “shall then be immediately acted on.”142 
DuVal responded to McKenney’s general directives first, convening another 
delegation of chiefs and admonishing them (in much more stern language) to surrender 
all runaways under their control.  By the treaty, he reproached, they were bound to 
deliver to the agent all the blacks they did not own.  This, “you have not done, although 
you have promised in your talk to do so; you are now called upon to fulfill the treaty.”  
Their conduct in the manner, DuVal chided, was the cause of “loud, constant, and just 
complaint on the part of the white people, who are thus deprived of their slaves.”  Deliver 
them up, “and do what, as honest men, you should not hesitate to do.”  Should they 
refuse, he warned, “I shall order my soldiers to go over your whole country, to search 
every part of it, from time to time, and seize on all runaway slaves by force.”  In the 
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confusion, the Indians might lose their own slaves, but the fault “will be your own, in 
trying to keep that which does not belong to you, and you will have no right to 
complain.”  Deliver the fugitives, “or immediate chastisement will follow your neglect; 
for I will order my soldiers from Tampa Bay to scour the country, and drag the runaways 
from their hiding-places, and make your nation suffer for its neglect and violations of the 
treaty.”143 
Beginning to illustrate his increasing unhappiness over the matter, DuVal not only 
forwarded the proceedings of that talk to Secretary Barbour, but he also wrote McKenney 
and complained to him personally.  “I am more and more convinced that the slaves 
belonging to the Indians are a serious nuisance,” he wrote.  It was a “great misfortune” 
that they held slaves in the first place, and should be allowed to sell them away.  “If this 
was done,” he continued, “you would never hear of the planters complaining that their 
slaves were constantly running away from them into the Indian nation.”  There had been 
no less than four men at the Agency just recently, he added, pushing their claims on him 
personally.  Perhaps the agent should be given permission to purchase some of the slaves 
for the use of the Agency.  Moreover, the territory’s citizens should be permitted to do 
the same, by contracts negotiated through Humphreys (as to “avoid all misunderstanding 
or fraud.”)144  DuVal had first recommended this course to the superintendent a few 
months previously: “I have never permitted in a single instance any white man to 
purchase a negro of an Indian,” he confided in January.  “But I am convinced the sooner 
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they dispose of them the better.”  With demands increasing by every mail, he had become 
even more certain of the necessity to remove them in any way possible.145 
Within a week of DuVal’s second letter to McKenney on the subject, citizens 
reasserted their own mounting displeasure, again petitioning the president.  This time, St. 
Johns County residents complained of their continued suffering in relation to the runaway 
issue: that without adequate resolution in the matter, they would “never be able to recover 
their property.”  Again reminding Washington of its fundamental oversight, the 
petitioners learned from DuVal that the governor’s command was not backed by “a 
sufficient force to execute his orders.”  Without this security, they warned, they would be 
forced “to abandon their plantations on the River St. Johns, and in the county of 
Alachua.”  Power had to be put under the governor’s control ample to retrieve runaways 
and prevent further losses.  The weak association of the Indian Agency with the military 
force in Florida was clearly lacking.  “Should government withhold her protecting hand,” 
they concluded, “your memorialists must be ruined, or driven to make reprisals on the 
Indians which may end in a war of extermination.”146 
Meanwhile, DuVal kept the pressure on McKenney with another heavily worded 
letter.  “I herewith transmit to you a paper,” he began, as a sample of claims “which have 
been and are daily present to the Agent and myself for slaves” argued to be in the Nation.  
It was these claims, he asserted, “which have in a great degree, occasioned do much 
dissatisfaction with the claimants as well as with the Indians.”  It was absolutely critical, 
he closed, that the Department adopt measures and prescribe specific rules under which 
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these claims may be decided.147  Both he and Agent Humphreys, the governor continued, 
were almost constantly engaged in persuading the chiefs to deliver slaves; some had done 
so, yet many more slaves were still daily claimed.  Were slaves and other valuables taken 
by the Seminoles in the skirmishes associated with the War of 1812 to be returned, 
DuVal asked?  In addition, numerous whites had deceitfully persuaded Indians into 
selling their slaves shortly before the state’s acquisition, or otherwise defrauded them 
under threats, and for “trifling sums of valuables.”  Many slaves had since re-escaped; 
they were again under the protection of the Seminoles, and the whites who acquired them 
wanted them back.  “Ought this property so obtained,” DuVal inquired, “under these false 
representations, now be delivered up to such claimants?”148 
The difficulty and trouble associated with the controversies, DuVal bemoaned, “is 
incalculable.”  Clearly frustrated by the situation, yet showing his resolve, the governor 
lamented that he could not consent to “that sort of left handed justice which gives all that 
is demanded of our citizens, & which withholds justice from this cheated and persecuted 
race.”  Again soliciting a military command, a post associated with the Agency was vital.  
“I assure you it is all important to secure the rights of the Indians as well as the peace of 
the country.”149 
Yet, in his own right, DuVal had achieved at least some measure of success 
flexing power through his own influence as superintendent.  In response to another of his 
stern talks with the chiefs in late February 1826, the Indians had evidently delivered up a 
large number of the slaves in the nation.  The governor commended himself for the 
success of his talk, noting that “my presence has done much to effect this and bring the 
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nation into order.”  At the same time, however, he again mourned the injustice seemingly 
calculated against the Seminoles by the never-ending requests for runaways flooding the 
Agency.  “I wish you would converse at large with Col Humphreys,” he deplored to 
Superintendent McKenney, “as to the manner these people have been cheated and 
imposed upon by some of the Inhabitants of Florida.” 
The persons who have been more clamorous about their claims on the 
Indians for property are those who have cheated under false reports, these people 
of their slaves who have since gone back to the Indians.  I have been adjudicating 
on these claims for some time almost daily since my arrival here.  The justice 
which the Indians are entitled to they cannot obtain, while they surrender to our 
citizens the slaves claimed by them, their own negroes that have been taken from 
them and are held by white people who refuse to deliver them up—I have felt 
ashamed while urging the Indians to surrender the property they hold, that I had 
not power to obtain for them their own rights and property held by our citizens.  
The government should have their property restored to them or pay to the Indians 
the value of it.  To tell one of these people that he must go to law for his property 
in our courts with a white man is only adding insult to injury.  I pray you ser will 
hear the agent on this subject who is possessed of many facts, highly deserving 
the attention of your department.  I have taken the most unwearied pains to have 
justice done to all parties but I confess—the Indian under the laws of the United 
States at present has but little share in its advantages.150 
 
McKenney finally answered DuVal’s salvo of letters in May 1826, but did not 
give the governor the news he was doubtless searching for.  The Indians, he stated 
plainly, “must be protected on the one hand from the press of the White people, of which 
you speak; and the white people from the depredations of Indians, on the other.”  The 
intercourse law alone would be the basis for this “mutual protection,” however, and its 
enforcement was enjoined upon him as governor, subject to the approval of the 
Department.  Furthermore, no buying or selling of slaves would be permitted by Agency.  
If the Indians owned slaves, they were their property.  Yet, “if they secrete runaway 
slaves, they must give them up to their rightful owners.”  In relation to those taken by the 
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whites, “the law of intercourse must be resorted to.”  The vague and unhelpful 
communication must have disappointed DuVal, who found no definitive instruction or 
comfort in the superintendent’s reply.151   
The chiefs were also responding to continued accusations of harboring runaways 
with a measured increase in suspicion.  They had replied to a particularly stern one, 
written by James Barbour, but delivered by Humphreys in May.  “Your great father has 
heard that you have runaway slaves in your country,” the secretary charged, “and that 
many of your people hide them from their owners.”  Barbour reiterated article six of the 
Treaty of Moultrie Creek, emphasizing that they were required to give them up, and that 
they would, “as soon as a slave runs into your country, take him up and deliver him to the 
agent for his rightful owner.”  The secretary of war reasserted the necessity of complying 
with that provision.  He then acknowledged the injustice of which DuVal spoke.  It had 
been said, the secretary admitted, that some slaves of the Indians were being held by 
whites.  The agent, he reminded the chiefs, was directed to see justice done them, and 
“whenever he finds your slaves in possession of the whites to demand their surrender.”152 
Answering that talk, chief Hicks responded with disappointment. “We do not like 
the story that our people hide the runaway negroes from their masters,” he began.  The 
nation did not find itself bound by the treaty to return those slaves they had in their 
possession before the treaty agreement was made, only those which had escaped into the 
country after 1823.  Regardless, they had never opposed whites coming into the nation 
when they had conclusively located and identified their property, and would not 
“hereafter oppose their doing so, but will give them all the assistance we can.”  At the 
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same time, however, they were determined to retrieve their own slaves.  And the constant 
press of slave claims—many for slaves which clearly belonged to the Indians—was 
beginning to strain their relationship with the territory’s authorities.  “The laws of the 
whites, who have so much better sense than the red men,” Hicks complained, “ought not 
to be less powerful and just.”153 
Agent Humphreys, who delivered Secretary Barbour’s talk and recorded the 
chiefs’ responses, shared Governor DuVal’s early uneasiness—including his desire to 
have the Indian slaves sold away if possible.  He noted to acting Governor McCarty more 
than a year later, in September 1827, that numerous applications “from a very respectable 
citizen of this vicinity,” were seeking to purchase several Indian blacks.  In his opinion, 
there was no question that it would prove a mutual beneficial transaction.  The blacks 
were, he described, “only slaves in name.”  They were treated in no fashion consistent 
with anything he had ever seen on a plantation, and the influence they exercised over 
their Indian masters was particularly instrumental in the heightening distrust of whites by 
the chiefs.  Here, the blacks held the most power, portraying settlers as being hostile to 
“all who differ in complexion.”  And, with “the recollection of the many acts of injury 
and injustice, which the Indians have received from their white brethren, it may be easily 
imagined, would make them give ready credence to these cunning suggestions of their 
negroes; whom they look upon, rather as fellow sufferers and companions in misery than 
as inferiors.”154 
In January 1827, Joseph White reasserted to McKenney and the Department his 
desire to adopt definitive instructions relative to slave property, remarking that he had 
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actually begun receiving numerous complaints, “by almost every mail.”  It was 
suggested, he continued, that the only “effectual means of preventing & remedying the 
evil” would be the delivery of the slaves to the Superior Court for trial.155  McKenney 
immediately responded that with every disposition of the Department to secure justice for 
Florida settlers, he did not know what was legal beyond the Intercourse Act of 1802.  He 
had written Humphreys a year previous, directing him to ascertain the locations of 
runaways, and pressing him, as agent, to exert all efforts in seeing them returned to their 
owners—a correspondence McKenney emphasized to White.  McKenney reissued that 
order to the agent the same day he returned White’s letter, but Humphreys was again 
away north, and was to return shortly.  “Would it not be advisable for all concerned to 
forward descriptive lists to the Agent?” McKenney instead counsled.  Reiterating his 
earlier directives to both DuVal and Humphreys, McKenney suggested that having the 
two men assist in identifying the fugitives as well as they could would “doubtless 
facilitate the recovery” of these citizens’ property.156   Humphreys had maintained that 
his influence as Indian agent was in many cases insufficient to affect these ends, or force 
compliance with runaway demands.  It is not easily perceived how McKenney thought 
further elucidation of this line of thinking would facilitate the claims process.  
Nevertheless, Humphreys’ personal influence was deemed sufficient; again, the 
Department skirted the Agency’s request for more powerful alternatives. 
After Humphreys returned to his office in August, he immediately received 
another request to purchase slaves, this time by a Mr. F. C. Fatio.  The agent forwarded 
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the request to acting Governor McCarty, who communicated it to the War Department in 
October.  The letters implicitly reopened the debate over the Agency’s ability to purchase 
slaves; McCarty also asked for an explanation of the laws regarding licenses and trading 
with the Indians, which might be of assistance in future cases.  McKenney responded in 
December that “the title is understood to be in the Indian; and his right to sell or refuse to 
sell is not questioned.”  It was decided by the secretary of war, however, “that no 
purchases can be made either directly or indirectly by any agent of the Government in the 
service of the Indian Department.”  The agent was directed to see that justice be done to 
the Indian in all cases, but was not to “commit the Government in any way, either as to 
the title of the Indian to his slave, or in any other way.”157 
Meanwhile Delegate White, flooded with requests and complaints of his own, 
grew tired of the Department’s apparent inability to decide the matter by May of 1828, 
and resolved to converse with the secretary of war directly.  “The repeated complaints I 
have received in relation to fugitive slaves,” he wrote, “make it necessary that some 
certain mode should be adopted for the more speedy & satisfactory decision of these 
questions.”  Rather than endorse the use of military force to simply pry the slaves away, 
White requested that Humphreys be issued orders referring all claims to the Judge of the 
district, and that the Judge be empowered to decide and report the cases to the 
Department, “so that an order may be issued on the basis of a judicial decision.”  This 
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method, White concluded, “will greatly promote the harmony of that part of the country 
& save the department itself a number of vexatious and difficult investigations.”158 
Evidently, the new secretary of war, Peter B. Porter, agreed with White’s 
suggestions.  Less than a week after White’s letter to the Department, McKenney wrote 
Governor DuVal requesting that he direct agent Humphreys to forward all claims to the 
Judge of the district.  Should the Judge’s decision be in favor of the claimants, DuVal 
was to order the slaves delivered in pursuance of that decision.  As per legal custom, the 
white claimant would be allowed to hold the property during the trial, upon providing a 
bond sufficient to abide by any future legal decisions, or return the property should the 
claim be in favor of the Indian.159   
Judge Joseph L. Smith of St. Augustine, selected for the purpose of settling these 
claims, accepted his responsibility in December.  He complained, however, that his 
adjudication was still subject to a final decision of the governor, who would to then order 
the agent to deliver the claimed slave to its owner.  “If such construction be adopted,” he 
warned, “a delay will ensue…in a great measure doing away the benefit of the 
arrangement made with the War Department.”  Delivery, he argued, should be made 
instantly upon his decision.  He was more than willing to take the position, he continued, 
but it had to be prosecuted to both parties’ success.  Smith did not mean any disrespect to 
the governor, he maintained, or to usurp his authority as Superintendent.  “My object is 
solely as expressed that the arrangement should be efficiently beneficial and acceptable 
both in regards to the Indians and the whites.”160  Once again, the Department agreed.   
McKenney wrote DuVal a week later, informing him that no other judgment in addition 
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to Smith’s would be necessary, and that claimed slaves were to be delivered over 
immediately upon that decision.161 
Escaping a lack of provision in the Treaty of Moultrie Creek the Department, 
through Delegate White’s suggestions, seemed to have solved the issue of force.  The 
authority complication would be routed through a system in which property claims could 
be tried by a formal judicial hearing—a process expounded by legislators and Judge 
Smith as one “efficiently beneficial and acceptable” to all parties: Seminoles, blacks, and 
settlers.  It was doubtless thought that the process would be equally embraced by both 
parties; the reluctance of the chiefs to accept the authority of the Agency, after all, and 
the unwillingness of the agent to seize demanded slaves without explicit authority, were 
the issues which had originally developed such controversies out of the claims.  A 
judicial hearing would, it seems, solve all of these discrepancies.   
Soon, however, setbacks associated with the trial system mounted.  White 
claimants were required to deliver a bond to the court which sufficiently covered the 
worth of the slave, for instance, thus assuring they would not attempt to steal the slave 
away without trial.  They were also required to surrender the slave if their property right 
was denied by the hearing.  In return, the Indian claimant was required to surrender the 
claimed slave or slaves to authorities before trial.  In many cases, the Seminoles were 
unwilling to do this.  They agonized—in many cases legitimately—that regardless of the 
judicial decision they would never again see the claimed bondsmen; fraudulent or 
insufficient bonds threatened the theft of the blacks by the white claimants in many 
instances, one way or another. 
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The Seminoles’ intransigence in the matter enraged DuVal, who doubtless also 
felt slighted by the removal of his control over the claims in general.  The governor 
delivered a blistering talk to a delegation of chiefs in the summer of 1828, threatening to 
deny the Seminoles the annuity money guaranteed by the Treaty of Moultrie Creek, 
unless they surrendered all of the claimed runaways.  Humphreys recorded their reply and 
forwarded it to the secretary of war for examination.  “I do not think the whites will be 
satisfied as long as we have a negro left,” Chief Hicks complained.  “Those which this 
angry talk of the governor is about we know are the property of the Indians, who have 
bought them and honestly paid for them, they do not belong to any white person.”  The 
chiefs recoiled against the idea of the governor withholding their payments even more 
bitterly, arguing its unethical purpose and illegality.  They did not agree with the annuity 
stoppages, “but if the white people want it and have a right to it they must keep it.”  162   
In his first confrontation with DuVal since the ration crisis in 1825, Humphreys 
agreed with the chiefs.  Shortly after the talk, Humphreys wrote Judge Smith complaining 
of the governor’s threat, and enquiring into its legality.  Smith retorted that he knew of 
“no right or equity in withholding from the Indians their annuity, because they do not 
give up to white claimants property which they allege is their own.”  By the Intercourse 
Act of 1802, stoppages in annuity could be ordered, or compensation to whites be 
subtracted from it, only in response to Indian depredations.  Even then, a stoppage could 
only be made upon proof, Smith concluded, “If I recollect the law correctly,” by an order 
of the President.163  Humphreys also complained to Secretary Porter of the governor’s 
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actions in September, and Judge Smith forwarded the subject to Delegate White in 
December.164 
As the framework for the trying of slaves was just being constructed, a 
considerable disagreement between the agent and the governor was brewing at the 
Agency, and Humphreys wasted no time confronting his superior.  As John Mahon has 
noted, “the two principle men grappling with the Indian problem in Florida seemed to be 
developing opposite attitudes toward their native charges.”  On the one hand, Humphreys 
had supported the Indians consistently during the first six years of his tenure.  “He spoke 
so strongly in their defense” during the 1825 crisis, Mahon suggested, he earned a grand 
jury indictment.  The controversy over slave claims had just undergone a promising 
development to him, as he doubtless viewed judicial hearings as the best possible 
course—one which would provide the Indians under his direct control the most security 
from rapacious citizens.165   Where Humphreys had sided with the chiefs during the 1825 
ration crises, and sustained them to the enragement of a number of legislators, he became 
almost totally sympathetic to their claims of property rights through 1827 and 1828.  He 
heard the complaints they made over the mounting claims from settlers, and he began to 
recognize then with an increasing suspicion.   
DuVal, “who seemed to show less and less sympathy for the Seminoles,” was not 
so passionate.  Where Humphreys viewed the Seminoles with this respect, and the whites 
with a calculated distrust, DuVal had developed the opposite viewpoint.  He had, on the 
one hand, made the earliest and most protective measures regarding slave controversies, 
including a total intercourse moratorium.  Yet, for his measured compassion, the 
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governor more importantly favored the region’s settlers.   As a faithful Democratic 
administrator, he valued the area’s rural development above all other concerns—
particularly those dealing with Indians and their supposedly free blacks.166   In the 
imminent confrontation, the governor did not agree with Humphreys’ course of action, 
the Department’s decision on how to have claims decided, or Smith’s power to adjudicate 
the cases.  Instead, leaning on his authority as Superintendent and as Humphreys’ 
superior, he moved to usurp the Judge’s appointment, and ordered the agent to seize 
slaves without the required judicial hearing. 
He ordered Humphreys to deliver one slave to a claimant while letters were being 
exchanged establishing the judicial hearing.  Humphreys complained of this action to 
Smith in the same letter in which he alerted the Judge to the annuity stoppage.  Property 
in possession of the Indians, Smith answered, could not be seized from them “but by 
treaty, by their consent, or by decision of courts of justice. General principles would 
forbid it, and I have seen no special statue, conferring such power on superintendents or 
agents.”  Smith also apprised White of the governor’s course.  These actions, predicated 
upon the ex parte statements of the area’s settlers, were usually fraudulent; even if they 
were truthful, the concept of having the slaves seized on those statements alone still 
critically undermined the theory of a judicial hearing, and his authority as Judge.167  
Humphreys, receiving this sort of reaffirmation in combination with unwillingness to 
deliver the slaves generally, doubtless ignored the DuVal’s order.  Though they had 
worked together smoothly for almost five years—where DuVal had “the utmost 
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confidence” in Humphreys as “active, and energetic”—the agent and governor were 
beginning to move in separate directions under the pressure of slave claims. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Mrs. Cook and Mrs. Hannay 
 
 
 When the relationships between agent Humphreys and both the governor and 
Department began to deteriorate around issues associated with slave claims, no two did 
more damage than the claims of Margaret Cook and Mary Hannay.  Like many others, 
both petitioned the Agency through attorneys, and demanded slaves they argued had 
runaway or been stolen by various Seminoles.  Unlike most, however, at least one of the 
women were widows.  They were no doubt forced by their difficult financial situations to 
retrieve any sources of income their estates had once possessed—slaves were valuable 
properties, and they desperately sought their return, whether rightfully or not.  Through 
their attorneys, these women pressed the agent relentlessly to have several slaves 
returned.  Eventually, their two claims became heated controversies between Humphreys 
and both their lawyers and his superiors, damaging the ties between the agent and the 
Indian Office in irreversible ways. 
 In the first of these claims to appear, Mrs. Cook had sought numerous runaways 
through a number of claims, and eventually succeeded in receiving most of those 
fugitives through the Agency.  Still, she charged, more were in the nation, and 
Humphreys was inconsistent in providing delivery.  Pressured by her lawyers over one 
fugitive in particular, referred to as Jack or John, Thomas McKenney requested 
Humphreys to “procure and deliver” the slave “on the same conditions as she received 
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the other Negroes claimed by her” in January of 1827.  Evincing his frustration over the 
claim, McKenney ordered the agent to respond with an “immediate answer,” reflecting 
the agents’ compliance with his order.168   
Frustrated by Humphreys’ apparent indisposition to comply with that request 
however, two months later the superintendent began to lose his temper.  Frequent 
complaints had been made to the Department, McKenney began to Humphreys, 
respecting slaves claimed by citizens of Florida; they had all been acted on by the 
Department in issuing orders for their seizure that Washington confidently expected 
would be obeyed.  Investigations were supposed to have been set up, decisions of 
ownership made, and slaves delivered.  “Nothing satisfactory has been received of you.”  
He then ordered Humphreys, by direction of the secretary of war, to attend immediately 
to the subject of slave claims “in a general way,” but particularly in the claim of Cook.  
The agent was to demand the slaves be delivered to Cook, immediately following her 
submittal of a bond with sufficient security to abide by the decision of Judge Smith’s 
decision.  He was also ordered to ensure a mutual cooperation, by satisfying the Indian 
claimants “of the propriety and justice of the course”—a position he had continually 
argued was becoming more impossible to maintain.  The chiefs were increasingly 
unwilling to surrender slaves with each proceeding claim, whether bonded or not, until 
the right of property had been decided upon.  Acknowledging the predicament, 
McKenney instructed Humphreys to ensure the chiefs that the claim had been properly 
set up, “and that this act is merely to secure the property until the right is decided, when if 
it be in them they will be restored.”169 
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 McKenney issued this order in February 1827—three months before secretary of 
war Peter Porter’s directive treating all cases in such a manner.  Soon, Judge Smith was 
selected to regularly adjudicate on all controversies.  In preparation for such a 
proceeding, however, not many people knew what to expect.  The white claimants 
certainly were not sure.  They were, as one interested observer noted, “very anxious” to 
ascertain exactly how the trial would be commenced, and before what sort of court.  They 
were particularly interested, for obvious reasons, to know if Indian testimony would be 
allowed, and if so, how it would be weighed.170 
 The Indians, on the other hand, voiced their extreme displeasure at the idea of 
surrendering the black man again to Mrs. Cook, after he had evidently been surrendered 
once and escaped.  Furthermore, they were incensed over another alleged threat to have 
their annuity withheld for noncompliance, and were increasingly reluctant to help the 
Agency with anything.  “We find that some of the whites are determined,” chief Hicks 
complained, “not to let us rest, as long as we have any thing that they want.”  Their 
warriors did not bring the slave in, the chief asserted, because they considered themselves 
“bound to do it.”  Instead, they did it because Humphreys had advised them to do so.  The 
black man was not a runaway, but “was raised in the nation, out of which he has never 
been.”  He had been bought legitimately, and Hicks angrily resented the concept of 
having his supposed worth deducted from their annuity and paid to Mrs. Cook—
especially when they continually argued that the man belonged to them.  They could not 
agree “that she be permitted to wrong us out of the money which is our due from our 
Great Father; and which he has said should be punctually paid to us.”  They could not 
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stop the government, he concluded, but if it had to be done, it would be “without our 
consent,” and they would think very harshly of it.171 
Humphreys forwarded these proceedings to Governor DuVal, noting that the 
Indians appeared hurt at the idea of Mrs. Cook getting the slave paid from their annuity—
particularly, he added, upon her own “interested ex parte statement.”  The agent took 
particular exception to this tactic.  Her claims would, he carped, “I hazard nothing in 
saying[,]” be found by any investigation to be “grossly if not designedly erroneous.”  
Humphreys could not believe that the Department would “for a moment” consider so 
“unjust and extravagant” a claim as what Mrs. Cook pretended to demand.  “I am 
naturally led to infer from the tenor of your language,” he continued, that the Seminoles 
were being deliberate and disrespectful in withholding the slave from Mrs. Cook.  Quite 
to the contrary, he defiantly countered.  “The claim, if such an opinion exists[,] it is a 
libel upon the nation, and those who have been instrumental in producing it, if it be as I 
suppose it must be[,] are those immediately interested in this business.”172 
To both Mrs. Cook and her lawyer John Hanson, he continued, he had repeatedly 
explained the difficulties and intricacies of the case, both personally and through multiple 
correspondences.  Through his own influence, he emphasized, the chiefs had brought in 
the claimed slave, but only after he repeatedly assured them that Hanson would pay them 
the balance of the original purchase money for which they claimed they sold the slave to 
Mrs. Cook.  The story was much more complicated than what Hanson was pretending.  
Allegedly, the original Seminole owner had dealt the slave for a “small pack horse” of 
goods, while he was in a “period of intoxication (artfully brought upon him for that 
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purpose in exchange for his slave).”  When he sobered up, he denied the sale, refused the 
goods, and left with the slave.  Other Indians took and consumed the goods, and now Mr. 
Hanson claimed ownership of the slave for Mrs. Cook by a legitimate right of sale.173   
Still, Humphreys persisted, he had convinced the Indians to surrender the slave, 
and placed him in irons at the Agency.  Through the night, however, the slave escaped, 
most likely with the help of another black man, and was currently being pursued by more 
Seminole warriors.  “It is manifest from the foregoing facts,” Humphreys angrily 
retorted, “that so far from the nation’s attempting to practice any want of firmness in the 
matter towards Mrs. C it is acting with a liberality which might be looked for in vain if 
the position of the parties were reversed.”174   
Humphreys also returned McKenney’s February order, explaining to the 
superintendent that by the time he received the correspondence ordering his participation, 
he had already dispatched a fourth search party to retrieve the slave in six months, and it 
had just recently come back empty handed.  In doing so, Humphreys rehashed an old 
argument.  He had utilized all means under his ability, he argued, short of issuing a 
military force which not only was forbid, but which would have also certainly resulted in 
hostilities.  And still, the slave could not be recovered.  In consequence, Humphreys 
bitterly intoned, “I have to ask the Department, what is to be done;” particularly, whether 
he had the authority to engage significant army forces from Fort King or Fort Brooke to 
utterly coerce a now hostile Indian population.175   
The friendly chiefs did not even pretend to dispute the title with Mrs. Cook, he 
pressed.   Yet they lacked control over the whole of the nation, and the sympathizing 
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parties were simply unable to pry the fugitive away from the Indians and blacks who 
were hiding him.  His personal influence was manifestly insufficient to gain this 
surrender, he argued, and he had tried everything he had authorization to attempt.  He had 
even sent his own deputation of blacks and horses, at his own expense, to hunt the 
runaway.  Furthermore, he had exhausted the support of the chiefs that were under his 
control, who had become unwilling to continually risk their lives “in a service which has 
always been a thankless one.”  Just recently one of these pursuits had “proved fatal to one 
of the most respected [and] valuable chiefs in the nation,” who was killed tracking down 
one such runaway.176   
By March, the slave had still not been delivered up, and Delegate White wrote 
McKenney that he had received several letters, presumably from Hanson, which 
“incontestably” established Mrs. Cook’s right to the property.  Recently, however, the 
Indian claimant who disputed that right had sold her claim to another white man.  If that 
was so, White asserted, Humphreys needed to pursue the claim with a renewed vigor, and 
have the slave surrendered as soon as possible; there was now no legitimate reason for 
the slave to be in the nation.  The right of property was then to be taken up by the district 
courts, as it had by that sale become a contest between two citizens.  Humphreys was 
therefore to cancel the bond given by Mrs. Cook in reference to her claim against the 
Indian.177  McKenney relayed this order to the agent soon after, also requesting that he 
report the proceedings to DuVal, “in order that the Department may be informed thro’ 
him of the same.”178   
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McKenney soon received Humphreys’ letter regarding the inability to retrieve the 
slave, however.  It was expected, he admonished the agent, that if it was in any way 
within his means as agent, he would have complied with the order.  “The military will not 
be employed.”179   His personal influence should, and would have to suffice.  Mrs. 
Cook’s lawyer soon wrote him directly over the slave, requesting his immediate 
compliance.  Not yet in possession of McKenney’s correspondence, and unaware that his 
request for military assistance had already been denied, the agent answered Hanson that it 
was not—yet at least—within his power to comply with his request.  “The Indians have 
declared their utter inability to apprehend the fugitive,” he stated, in consequence of 
which he wrote the War Department and asked for the military aid necessary to have him 
surrendered.  He was now waiting for its reply.  He also informed Hanson that the Indian 
contesting her claim, Nelly Factor, had sold her right to another citizen.  In the event of 
this statement becoming “satisfactorily established,” Humphreys alerted Hanson, Mrs. 
Cook’s bond would no longer be necessary, as the case “would cease to be one in which 
the U States could take any interest of cognizance.”180 
Hanson read the agent’s letter and soon vented his frustration over the situation to 
another of Cook’s lawyers, excoriating Humphreys for his almost criminal reluctance to 
follow direct, repeated commands.  Humphreys cared no more “about the orders of the 
Secretary of War” than he did for his own word.  If he so chose, Hanson accused, he 
could perpetually “find some way” to refuse the secretary’s orders, “let them ever be so 
positive.”  A “pretty story indeed,” that the whole nation would be so afraid of one slave.  
To admit that he could do nothing, Hanson continued, only proved that the agent had no 
                                                 
179 McKenney to Humphreys, March 17, 1828, ibid.: 372. 
180 Humphreys to Mrs. Margaret Cook, April 17, 1828, LR FLA, r. 287. 
  
84
authority over the nation, and had to be removed.  His most bitter condemnation was 
reserved for Humphreys releasing the bond and his implied participation: “now what do 
you think of this,” he fumed, “does not the man deserve to be hung.”  The slave had to be 
found; if not, they would demand from the Government three hundred dollars for him 
“and let them pay it and deduct it from the annuity.”181 
Hanson forwarded Humphreys’ letter to Delegate White a few days later, 
remarking that as the Representative could plainly see, Mrs. Cook was no nearer to 
obtaining her property than when the Secretary issued his first order to the agent in 
January—an order that Mr. Hanson claimed was “as full and positive as it possibly 
could” have been.  Contrary to what Humphreys alleged, Hanson insisted that as agent, 
he had control over both the forces at Forts King and Brooke, and condemned him for not 
dispatching troops to have the slave apprehended.  Not only was his assumption wrong, 
but had such force been resorted to, it would have met with fierce resistance.  Still 
Hanson raged.  Humphreys’ address to Washington requesting further directions, Hanson 
charged, amounted to “nothing more or less [than] to know whether he is to obey the 
order of the Secretary of War.”  “I am convinced,” he concluded, “that if the War 
Department was acquainted with the dissatisfaction that exists among the people of this 
Territory generally against Col. Humphreys, he would be removed from office 
immediately.”182 
In addition, Hanson relayed his extreme displeasure to Governor DuVal, who in 
turn forwarded that correspondence to McKenney in May.  “My order for the delivery of 
the slave being given directly to the Agent, by the Secretary of War,” DuVal stated, “I do 
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not know what further step I could take to ensure the delivery of the slave.”183  A month 
later, McKenney returned the governor’s mail, responding that everything in the power of 
the Department had been done, “to ensure to the Citizens of Florida, a restitution of their 
property, in the persons of their Slaves.”  It was not known, McKenney echoed the 
governor, if anything else could be done.  Withholding annuity, however—the weapon 
DuVal had been lately using to threaten Seminoles into surrendering various slaves—was 
“not esteemed to be proper.”  DuVal had the intercourse law and that alone to govern 
such situations.  “Let that be respected and its terms complied with—but further cannot 
be sanctioned.”184  This denial must certainly have come as a blow to the governor, 
frustrating another attempt to have the controversies resolved.   
Hanson wrote DuVal in August, however, thanking him for his kindness and 
efforts in the case.  He wasted no time thereafter attacking the agent, suggesting that 
McKenney was “not perfectly correct” in saying that the government had done 
everything in its power.  It was true that he had given the agent his orders, but the 
Department had not adequately enforced their execution.  “Had the agent obeyed the 
order he has received,” Hanson emphasized, “there would now be no complaint.”  He 
also accused Humphreys of improperly improving the Agency and charging personal 
work to the government, assuring DuVal that all his charges could be proved.  The 
controversy between the agent and Hanson had “reached a pitch,” that longer forbearance 
on his part, he concluded, would put him at fault.185  By that time, the case had arrived at 
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the District court, and its proceedings were being watched by Delegate White.186  It is not 
known, however, whether the runaway was ever apprehended.  
While this controversy was beginning to reach its feverish pitch, the claim of Mrs. 
Mary Hannay was developing as well.  A black woman named Sarah and her four 
children were claimed by Hannay through her agent Archibald Clark, by a bill of sale that 
was over thirty years old.187  Clark wrote McKenney that he had personally apprised 
Humphreys of the claim, proved to him that the adverse claim of the Indian “could not be 
well founded,” and demanded the slaves be surrendered from the chiefs immediately for 
trial.  “Some considerable time having elapsed,” Clark declared, he rewrote the agent, 
suspicious of his indisposition, and urged him to have the slaves delivered, and “abide by 
the decision,” of the assigned tribunal.  Nothing had resulted from that letter either, Clark 
grumbled, and so nothing remained but to address McKenney, “at the head of the War 
Office for Indian Affairs,” to remonstrate the “neglect of the Agent,” and respectfully 
request that he as superintendent demand the delinquent agent forthwith to see to the 
claimed slaves’ capture and trial.188 
McKenney responded quickly, ordering Humphreys in early March to deliver the 
slaves to Hannay or her agent immediately.  He was also to see to it that a bond of 
sufficient security be accepted to ensure their complete participation.  That order he also 
forwarded to Clark, regretting “that so much trouble should have been had on the subject 
to which it relates.”189  Two months later, an incensed Clark penned McKenney, 
complaining that the bond he had prepared was rejected by the agent.  Clark had written 
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the terms in duplicate, and for the sum of two thousand dollars—more than adequate—to 
“relieve the case from further difficulty,” and guard “as much as possible against 
objections that might be raised by the agent” as to its competency.  After a delay of over 
forty days, Clark noted, Humphreys finally replied that different security would be 
necessary; the security previously offered resided outside the territory and as such, was 
insufficient.190 
“Without knowing more particularly the character of the agent,” Clark was unable 
to personally attack him for his actions.  “But sir,” he protested, he had asserted upon the 
agent the destitute nature of Mary Hannay, who was widowed and with six children.  
There was a necessity in her case to keep the expense and grief as much to a minimum as 
possible.  Security in Georgia—her state of residence—was all that she could provide.  In 
light of this, Clark contended, Humphreys “certainly does appear to me most absurd and 
preposterous to impose upon her the necessity of procuring as securities for her bond, 
persons residents of the Territory.”  It was almost as if the agent was raising every 
difficulty in his power “for the sole purpose of producing embarrassment, delay, and 
finally a total abandonment of the claim.”  Clark considered any citizen of the nation, “no 
matter in what state,” competent security, and demanded that Hannay’s bond be accepted 
by the agent.  “I extremely regret that I have again been compelled to complain to the 
Department of this officer’s conduct,” he closed.  “But considering it as I do—highly 
reprehensible[—]I cannot but earnestly solicit in behalf of the distressed claimant” the 
redress of the Department.191 
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McKenney quickly wrote both DuVal and Clark over the controversy, lamenting 
to the Governor that he regretted “that any unnecessary difficulty” should have been 
“thrown in the way of a trial” of these slaves and their ultimately delivery to the proper 
owners.  DuVal was to immediately order Humphreys to accept the bond, without the 
“condition which it appears he has superadded,” requiring the bondsmen be residents of 
the territory.  “They only question will be are they competent?  If they are let the negroes 
be given up and the security offered received.”192  DuVal reiterated that judgment to both 
Humphreys and Clark, ordering the Agent to accept Clark’s security, and reassuring 
Archibald that the agent could add no further condition to the bond other than what the 
Department prescribed.  If the security was competent, it should have nothing to do with 
residency.193 
Humphreys received the order, and wrote DuVal over the situation, noting that the 
order would be immediately attended to.  He could not help, however, but confess the 
apprehension that he would find considerable difficulty in judging on the security of the 
bond, considering it resided in another state.  His situation, Humphreys continued, 
“would be awkward and embarrassing in the extreme,” should he accept security that 
would ultimately be insufficient to keep Hannay from whisking the slaves away.  
Ultimately, Humphreys feared, the opposing Indian claimant, also a woman, would be 
left to suffer.  He again found himself morally conflicted.  On the one hand, he had been 
issued explicit orders from the Department—orders which gave him almost no alternative 
than to accept the bond, knowing nothing about its competency.  On the other hand, he 
clearly worried that the bond would ultimately prove insufficient—that the slaves would 
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be stolen out of the territory, and that he would be able to do nothing about it.  Unwilling 
to take the chance, Humphreys again petitioned Washington for specific instructions in 
these and like cases.194 
He also, however, again accepted the bond, and approached the chiefs with 
demands to have the slave family surrendered.  Not surprisingly, they refused.  They, like 
Humphreys, feared that the family would be swept out of the territory before the trial 
even commenced, or that regardless of its adjudication, Hannay would not re-surrender 
them.  Humphreys relayed this information to Hannay’s lawyers, explaining that the 
chiefs absolutely refused to let the slaves be taken from the nation in consideration of the 
bond Hannay provided.  They would, as he had earlier explained, surrender the property 
after an investigation and decision had been made adverse to the Indian woman’s claim.  
In an effort to compromise, at least, the Indians had consented to surrender the claimed 
slaves to the agent, and have them secured at the Agency until the trial had concluded.  
Under no circumstance, however, would they consent to surrender them directly to 
Hannay or her attorneys.195 
Humphreys also apprised the governor of these developments, likewise notifying 
him that the chiefs “positively, but respectfully,” objected to the procedure.  They were 
willing to “cheerfully submit” to the decision of Judge Smith, he reiterated, “but they 
wholly refuse their assent to a relinquishment of a possession of the disputed property, 
before the matter has been adjudicated upon, and an award given adverse to their claim.” 
If force was resorted to in demanding the slaves, Humphreys pressed, they could not 
possibly offer any opposition, other than to “appeal to the justice and good faith of the 
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government.”  It was regrettable that the trial ordered by the Department could not be 
instituted until this sort of surrender had to be made.  The system had been calculated to 
benefit all, doing much more to settle the “troublesome controversies,” than had any 
other option—controversies which were productive “of more ill feeling between the 
Indians and their neighbors than all other causes combined.”  Yet the necessity of the 
Indians to surrender the claim before the trial took place undermined its integrity.  Even 
worse, the theft of the slaves under supposed bond, and the confrontations which ensued 
over security, completely nullified its intended good.196 
Archibald Clark, upon receiving word of Humphrey’s letter to Mr. Lowe, 
instantly addressed McKenney in October 1828, and proceeded to flay the agent with 
remarkable ferocity.  Not only was Mrs. Hannay’s agent turned away without the claimed 
slaves, but was first delayed several weeks.  “Having been twice disappointed in the 
recovery of this property,” Clark complained, “and great expense incurred, by one ill able 
to support it, I now feel at a loss how to proceed.  Too long as this officer is permitted to 
occupy the station he does, it cannot be believed that the Citizens of the country will ever 
obtain justice in their controversies with the Indians.”197  
The agent, Clark was sure, purposefully withheld the fugitives from their rightful 
owner, (who he knew, he continued, “to be a poor and destitute widow”) until 
compounding expenses would force her to give up the claim, or dispose of it “on their 
own terms.”  If this officer considered himself “beyond the reach of the orders issued 
from the War Department,” he bemoaned, there was no other option than to appeal 
directly to Congress.  Yet, as Clark appealed, Humphreys was appointed by the president, 
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and being “amenable to the orders of the War Office,” there was no reason why this 
agent’s flagrant disobedience had not already subjected him to a violation of his duty.  
This, Clark hoped, might still happen, and relieve the “good citizens” of the region “of an 
officer, who has already brought down upon him the…indignation of all persons who 
have had occasion to transact business with him in his official character.”198 
In 1829, Clark also wrote the new secretary of war, John Eaton, and forwarded 
McKenney numerous correspondence which he hoped might aid in the Department’s 
investigation of Humphreys, which was by that time in progress.  The other object, Clark 
explained, was to again present the subject of his claim, which he asserted “has been for 
the past thirty years withheld from its lawful owner.” McKenney returned his request 
several months later, noting that an investigation into his particular claim had begun in 
the Department, and Clark would be updated when it had been concluded.199  That 
enquiry McKenney also sent to Humphreys, postmarked the same day.  “I am directed by 
the Secretary of War,” McKenney wrote, to enquire into the reasons why the claim of 
Mrs. Hannay had not yet been delivered.  Were the slaves in Florida, or under the control 
of the agent?  Furthermore, McKenney asked, were the new terms of bond defined and 
accepted?200 
Humphreys answered by explaining to the superintendent what he had already 
told both Clark and DuVal: that the chiefs regarded the slave Sarah as their property, 
“and that they could not consent to surrender it, until the matter should be adjudicated 
upon,” and a ruling made adverse to their claim.  As with the Cook claim, they in no way 
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refused to surrender the property after such a decision was made—but were determined 
against releasing them any sooner.  The agent also remarked that the fugitives were in the 
country, but not under his control, “denied as he is (by the Department in a letter received 
from you some months since) the use of the means requisite, to enable him to effect a 
compliance with its orders, upon the subject.”  There was a meeting with a delegation of 
chiefs schedule the next day, Humphreys concluded; the order for the slaves would be re-
read, its compliance urged, and their response recorded.201 
Humphreys communicated that talk to Lieutenant Governor Westcott in late 
February 1830, once again reiterating that there was no way the Indians would surrender 
the slave until a trial had been concluded.  They would go so far “as to offer resistance by 
force and arms,” Humphreys added, although the Indians themselves held a “humiliating 
sense of their weakness,” and surely realized how hopeless of a struggle it would quickly 
become.  Still, he argued, that determination emphasized how resistant they were to 
further surrendering slaves in these sorts of cases, “which they evidently think would be 
construed in a measure as an abandonment of their claim,” no matter how he attempted to 
assure them otherwise.202 
“As a means to avoid unpleasant extremities,” Humphreys suggested, why not 
extend to the chiefs the ability to bond the property under dispute, a privilege regularly 
afforded to the white claimants.  “This would afford the white claimant the same kind of 
protection proposed to the opponent,” Humphreys argued, “and I have no doubt the 
Indians could and would if such alternatives were presented to them, give satisfactory 
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security for the forthcoming of the negroes when requiring legal authority to give 
them.”203 
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Chapter Six 
 
Humphreys’ Investigation 
 
 
 Government officials, for the most part, ignored Humphreys by the time he 
suggested alternatives to the system in 1829.  In fact, some had begun doing so by 1828.  
They were, instead, blaming him for the failures of the Agency in increasingly 
unambiguous language.  In a January 1828 “Report to the Legislative Council Committee 
on Indian Affairs,” for instance, a House Indian Affairs committee stated the obvious: 
that “much complaint” existed in the country, and because of the reluctance in which 
runaways had been surrendered “by the proper authorities to their lawful owners.”  On 
the one hand, direct evidence of malicious intent was unavailable.  Yet, that there was 
complaint, “a reference to the numerous letters on file in the war office” could easily 
illustrate.  As the committee’s report continued, blame became much more directed.  
Most importantly, the “probable causes” of these difficulties, could be traced “to interest 
and unwarrantable interference” on the part of those connected with the tribes—in short, 
agent Humphreys.  Removal could not possibly be affected, they concluded, until 
different sentiments were “diffused among them.”  Humphreys needed to be removed.204  
 Governor DuVal enthusiastically agreed with the Legislative Council, having 
grown disgusted by the agent’s alleged excuses in late 1828.  In September, while 
responding to his latest rebuff of Archibald Clark in the case of Mary Hannay’s claim, 
DuVal finally washed his hands of the man.  “I shall state to the Department,” he began, 
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that Humphreys had not “impressed the Indians with the necessity of complying with 
orders relating to the delivery of slaves in the nation,” and that if he had done his job, “no 
difficulty would have occurred.”  As the first officer of the territory, DuVal continued, it 
was his duty to see that the orders of the government were “promptly executed,” and with 
every effort in his ability—Humphreys had clearly not endeavored to do the same.  
Finally, the governor refused any further communication with the agent on the subject of 
Indian affairs, at least until he had been counseled by the War Department on the whole 
situation.205 
 That same day, DuVal also forwarded a number of his letters with Humphreys to 
McKenney, upbraiding the agent’s conduct.    DuVal had also ordered the chiefs’ annuity 
retained in order to enforce the slaves’ surrender, and vowed not to “recede from the 
ground” he had taken, until otherwise directed by the secretary of war.  “It is well known 
that the Agent of any Indian tribe,” he noted, could induce chiefs to sign practically any 
paper he wanted, or to enforce any act he recommended.  Under that assertion, “I say 
without hesitation,” that Humphreys could “have any order carried into effect” that the 
Department wished, “even to removal of the whole nation,” yet particularly regarding 
runaway slaves.  His own personal command of the respect of the chiefs, DuVal 
confided, and his “knowledge of their facility,” alone warranted his statements.  
Concluding his diatribe, an impartial, professional enquiry had to be initiated into the 
conduct of the officer, of which he thoroughly disapproved.206   
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The governor also forwarded a number of missives supporting his accusations.207  
He included seven attachments in all, containing several correspondences he had with the 
agent, affidavits from concerned or outraged citizens, and his remarks.  One of these 
remarks was written on the Humphreys-DuVal correspondence made over an order to 
have Hannay’s slaves delivered immediately, written in August 1, 1828.  In that order, 
pursuant to McKenney’s request, DuVal had directed Humphreys to accept Hannay’s 
bond, regardless of the residencies of those she listed as securities.  In response, 
Humphreys reported two weeks later that he was extremely wary of the bond her lawyers 
had presented him.  He was hesitant to accept the bond, and have it prove insufficient to 
insure Hannay’s continued cooperation.  Therefore, Humphreys concluded, he would 
delay the order’s execution until he “may be furnished with instructions” for his 
government “on the point in question.”  Essentially, DuVal argued, Humphreys informed 
him that he was, respectfully of course, ignoring his order.208  This, the governor fumed, 
was preposterous.  “The delay in the execution of this order, for the reasons assigned by 
the Agent, is only evidence of his determination to evade the order.”209 
DuVal also remarked to McKenney about Humphrey’s letter of August 15, which 
also contained a talk he gave to the chiefs over the slaves in Mary Hannay’s claim.  
Firstly, DuVal declared, the proceedings of the talk—and the Indians’ argument in it—
sounded more like it was manufactured by Humphreys than it actually reflected “the 
concise brevity of the Indians.”210  This talk DuVal forwarded to McKenney, further 
remarking that the order to have the slaves delivered was given by the recommendation 
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of the Department, with “such information as satisfied the Secretary of its justice.”  It was  
insulting that the agent would, “more than a year after the time the order should have 
been executed,” attempt to not only lecture the Department on its alleged injustice, but 
ignore its commands.  If the Department and superintendent continued to submit to 
having their orders “thus evaded by the agent,” DuVal warned, “and our citizens 
consequently deprived of their property,” the outcome would “be worse than useless to 
expect insubordination in their Agents.”  He had no doubt that if Humphreys had been at 
least sufficiently threatened by the Department into doing his duty, “the order would have 
been executed long since without difficulty.”211 
The third correspondence DuVal forwarded to the superintendent was no less 
pejorative.  He first copied Humphrey’s September communication notifying the 
governor that the chiefs had “positively, but respectfully” declined to have Hannay’s 
slaves surrendered.  Humphreys also complained of the bond controversy generally, 
regretting that the order to have claims adjudicated by Judge Smith was not being 
correctly executed.  The agent sent these comments by express to the governor, so that 
the Department would be “seasonally apprised of the facts” in the case.212   
“I have never heard before,” DuVal retorted angrily, “that the Indians had 
objected to the delivery of these slaves,” when sufficiently ordered by the Department.  
He also doubted the Indians’ ability to comprehend any judicial proceeding, and resented 
Humphreys’ avowal that the chiefs would readily abide by Judge Smith’s 
recommendation.  They would no more “attend to the order of a judge,” he barked, “than 
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to that of a private individual.”  All difficulty in these cases, he concluded, originated 
with Humphreys’ injudiciousness.  As long as the Department allowed him to continue 
evading its orders, he as governor could not discharge his duty “in any other manner than 
by respectfully remonstrating.”  He also reiterated to McKenney his severing the ties 
between his governorship and Humphreys’ agency.  Not that it mattered, he rationalized, 
as he was convinced his orders would go unexecuted regardless.213 
In consideration of his moratorium, DuVal did personally return one more of 
Humphreys’ notes—his express letter of September 23—although only because the 
original missive declining any further communication had most likely not made it to the 
Agency when Humphreys wrote back.  A copy of that letter, DuVal informed 
Humphreys, along with others and remarks, had been forwarded to the Department for its 
consideration.  Nothing else would be done, until he had received a response.  
Washington must decide on the whole situation, he closed, “and either approve your 
conduct—and thus surrender all direction of Indian affairs—or enforce their orders.”214   
Six days later, in early October, Humphreys did receive the governor’s mail.  And 
it was read, according to the stunned agent, “with no little surprise.”  Unfortunately, 
Humphreys wrote, “I am unable to obtain your approbation of the manner in which I have 
discharged my duties,” at least in relation to slave claims.  He could not but feel angered, 
however, at the governor’s insensitivity—even callousness—on the subject. “You 
attribute to me a disregard of duty no wise warranted by any circumstances that have 
occurred,” he countered, “and therefore inconsistent with that liberality and justice I have 
a right to expect at your hands.”  That delays had occurred, Humphreys readily admitted.  
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They were not any consequence of his lack of effort, however.  In an argument the agent 
had made to the Department numerous times before, he blamed inaction on the lack of 
military power necessary in the confrontations which almost always developed.  Had he 
been issued that authority, “there would have been far less difficulty in enforcing 
obedience to the instructions of the Department.”  Furthermore, his facilities were not 
sufficient to keep slaves from escaping, and the chiefs had lost the confidence required to 
deliver them under the present system of bonds.215 
Humphreys also reiterated these complaints directly to the Department, 
addressing Secretary of War Peter B. Porter two days after he wrote DuVal, on October 
10.  There was no other way of communicating to the Department, than directly through 
the secretary, Humphreys began by apologizing.  Governor DuVal had, after all, declined 
all correspondence with him, and thus effectually closed his line of communication 
through the Indian Office.  Humphreys alluded that DuVal greatly disapproved of his 
conduct in relation to slave claims, “and that, on this account, he had determined to report 
me as a delinquent.”  Of the governor’s actions, Humphreys argued, predicated as they 
were on “the ex parte statements of irresponsible and interested persons,” and completely 
untrue, “I have a good right to complaint.”  DuVal evidently did not fully realize the 
difficulties of his position.  The agent also forwarded Porter a copy of his August talk 
with the chiefs as evidence, which he hoped would illustrate the chiefs’ complete refusal 
to surrender slaves.  From this talk, Humphreys wrote, it may be easily perceived “their 
feelings in regard to the delivery required of them of certain negroes, and how far I am 
obnoxious to censure for the failure of the Indians to comply with the orders directing 
said delivery.”  He, as agent, had pressed every single one of these predicaments on to the 
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governor, and so on through the chain of command.  “I have no fear of reproach from 
them.”216   
The agent then proceeded to attack DuVal’s allegations on a more personal level.  
“That I have questioned the policy, and even doubted the justice, of some of the measures 
directed in the property controversies between the whites and Indians, I am free to 
admit.”  Perhaps this was presumptuous, Humphreys concluded; “but if so, it was 
honest.”  Furthermore, Humphreys warned Porter, DuVal’s dangerous course of action in 
continually threatening to withhold annuity payments would soon be considered by the 
Indians as an infraction of the treaty, “and serve to impair their confidence in the 
kindness and justice of the government.”217  
Nevertheless, the cascade of complaints against the agent which began with the 
Legislative Council and intensified with Governor DuVal, continued with the 
Superintendent and Secretary of War.  McKenney wrote Porter in early November 1828, 
outlining the accusations which had been lately made against him.  “In a general way,” 
McKenney began, for two years various complaints of the agent had been made through 
Delegate White by “those who felt aggrieved,” and by others who accused him of a “want 
of disposition to aid them” in recovering their runaways.  From time to time, McKenney 
continued, orders were issued by the Department “of the most preemptory character, 
perfectly to the satisfaction of the claimants,” which more than addressed the 
controversy.  Claimants regularly responded, however, that they were unable to secure 
their property, as Humphreys “was determined not to assist them.”218 
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One citizen, Zephaniah Kingsley, accused the agent directly of keeping his slaves 
at the Agency under a different name, and also to keeping and working Margaret Cooks’ 
claimed slaves there for more than a year, even after they were positively ordered by the 
Department to be delivered.  McKenney also cited the Legislative Council report, arguing 
its implication of Humphreys’ “illicit traffic of slaves,” although, he admitted, “no proof 
accompanies this.”   In a third charge, another letter outlined the “vexatious” state of 
affairs in the territory in relation to the agent’s conduct.  It concluded, McKenney wrote, 
that “if the War Department was informed of the dissatisfaction that exists among the 
people of the Territory, generally, against Colo. Humphreys, he would be removed 
immediately.”  This was most likely a letter from Mrs. Cook’s lawyer John Hanson, in 
consideration of the controversy over her claim.  “It is certainly true,” McKenney added, 
“that great dissatisfaction does exist.”219   
A fourth charge was contained in a similar letter by Archibald Clark.  He accused 
Humphreys of “opposing obstacles” to the recovery of their slaves, by repeatedly denying 
them his assistance, particularly in rejecting Mary Hannay’s out-of-territory security.  
Clark’s letter was a strong one, McKenney added, “and I know no excuse that can be 
offered for the agent in the course he took.”220  Yet another re-accused the agent of 
speculating in the slaves he was required to deliver.  According to the affidavit of a Mr. 
William Everett, he bought numerous slaves from chiefs at a reduced rate—the only way, 
Humphreys had allegedly assured Everett, that they could be secured for delivery.  Yet, 
as Everett claimed, he had not seen his slaves since the reported sale, except once or 
twice at the Agency, and was convinced that Humphreys, “instead of aiding in their 
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recovery…[raised] obstacles in order to purchase them at reduced prices.”  If these 
accusations were proved true, McKenney warned, Humphreys obviously had to be 
removed.  On the other hand, whether he really bought them for himself or not was 
irrelevant; he had been refused the ability to buy slaves under any circumstance, and this 
order “it appears he has disregarded.”  In relatively unrelated charges, McKenney also 
included accusations from John Hanson that he improved the Agency land for his own 
use, including sugar works, and charged his bills to the government.221 
The superintendent also reiterated DuVal’s request that the agent’s actions be 
investigated.  “He is loudly, and constantly complained against,” he added, “and has been 
for two years—the directions of the Department have not been conformed to by him;” on 
the questions of difficulty, “his answers, and reasons appear evasive.”  Finally, whether 
the most egregious allegations were sustained or not, “such is the excitement against the 
agent in Florida,” and especially since DuVal “assumed the relation to him which he 
has,” that there was very little confidence that he could effectively control the territory at 
all, ever.  Particularly shameful, his dealing with slaves after positively ordered not to 
“indicated a dealing of insubordination which makes it questionable whether orders on 
any other subject would be met differently.”  If that were the case, certainly the duties of 
his agency would be “more acceptably” performed by someone else.222 
Secretary Porter read McKenney’s report and forwarded his own conclusions on 
to President John Quincy Adams.  Porter offered Adams proof the agent’s “having 
connived with the Indians in the concealment of runaway slaves,” with the intent, he 
emphasized, of purchasing them for himself.  In addition, the representations of both 
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DuVal (who had “declined all official intercourse with him on account of his conduct”) 
and Col. White, “go strongly to confirm the charges.”  The interests of the government, 
Porter declared, required “his speedy removal.”  The secretary went so far as to 
recommend a replacement, Captain William Beard of Maryland, who, like Humphreys, 
was “late of the Army.”223  
President Adams chose, instead, to order an investigation.  Somewhat in 
agreement with that decision, Col. White wrote Porter in December that he had spoken to 
Adams, and understood that the President was unwilling to act on accusations “so 
seriously affecting the character of an individual,” until Humphreys had a chance to 
explain himself.  The allegations were, White suggested, liable to the agent’s reputation; 
to wait until the agent could present a defense sounded like a reasonable request.  Yet, he 
pondered almost sarcastically, how far “the want of harmony,” the “serious 
embarrassments to the public service,” and the numerous “public complaints on file” 
could justify the removal of the agent—that he did not “presume to decide.”224 
White proceeded to address the House of Representatives on the subject three 
days later, requesting that an independent investigator be assigned.  To that position he 
recommended Alexander Adair, Esq.—the Marshall of Tallahassee.  McKenney wrote 
Adair after his appointment was confirmed, forwarding him a number of papers 
containing the charges leveled against Humphreys.  Adair was to investigate each charge, 
hear Humphreys’ defense, and relate everything back to the Department, with his own 
opinion added.225  Adair soon accepted the position, and vowed to attend to the 
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investigation with as little delay as possible.  Yet, it would take a while, as there were 
numerous complainants, and their residences were disbursed through a very rural north 
Florida.  In addition, Adair enquired, were the formalized charges to be restricted to those 
written by the Department? Some of the complaints were so vague or “indirectly alluded 
to,” Adair confessed, he was confused as to whether he should consider them formal 
charges or not—although, he added, “I have reason to believe they would be insisted 
upon.”226 
Once instigated, it took Adair three months to prosecute his investigation.  He 
moved from St. Augustine, north to St. Mary’s in Georgia, and then southwest to Fort 
King and the Agency in Central Florida.  In April, he wrote the Department that he had 
finished taking his depositions, yet was not ready to report his conclusions.  This 
prolonged absence, he apologized, was consequent to both the horrible conditions in 
Florida, and his ailing health.227  A little over two weeks later, he forwarded the secretary 
of war his full report, containing formal charges, questions, countless depositions and his 
own additions.  He had also forwarded those papers to Humphreys, in order that the agent 
could write his formal defense.  At the time Adair returned his investigation to the 
Department, Humphreys’ defense had not yet come to hand.  It was expected shortly, 
Adair noted however, and he would forward it to Washington as soon as possible.228   
From the magnitude of the charges and the fanaticism with which they were 
preferred, Adair’s report began, “not a doubt was entertained that all needful assistance 
would be afforded to facilitate the investigation.  What was my surprise to find the 
reverse.”  Those who were “most clamorous,” in their accusations were the most hesitant 
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to give any sort of deposition at all, and the testimony that was given by one often 
contradicted others.229  The first charge he elucidated in his investigation reflected the 
complaints which accused Humphreys of willfully disobeying the orders of the 
Department, in having claimed slaves surrendered to their owners—particularly those of 
Mrs. Hannay and Mrs. Cook.  To that charge, Adair wrote Secretary of War John Eaton, 
the three depositions he took did not sustain the charge.  “They show no want of respect 
for the orders of the Department,” he added, “or zeal in the discharge of duty.”  Among 
the depositions he included evincing that conclusion was of a Daniel Meickler, which 
accounted the controversy over Mary Hannay’s claim.230   
Meickler recalled that Humphreys had originally rejected Hannay’s bond in 
consequence of its being non-local, but after consultation with others in his general 
vicinity, soon accepted it.  Humphreys then directed Meickler, with a small complement 
of soldiers and an interpreter, into the nation to retrieve the slave.  That party met an 
alarming resistance, however, and returned without success.  According to the deposition, 
Humphreys then confronted the chiefs angrily and demanded the slave, threatening the 
use of a stronger military force—threats the chiefs heatedly returned.  The agent then re-
sent a considerably larger squad into the nation, containing a lieutenant and ten soldiers, 
and directed them to scour the area for the fugitive.  Again, however, their force returned 
empty handed.  Meickler also recollected that about that time, he became informed by a 
letter that Humphreys, who was then in Tallahassee, had come upon information which 
brought Hannay’s bond into serious suspect.  Only under that information, and in genuine 
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regard for the well-being of the Indians, did Humphreys then alert Hannay’s attorney, 
Archibald Clark, that security within the territory would be necessary.231  So far from 
deserving censure, Meickler’s deposition seemed to prove Humphreys’ dedication to 
executing his authority with power, yet respect—whether that meant denying seizure of 
slaves or enforcing it.  
In the controversy over Cook’s slave John, who Humphreys was also unable to 
secure, a deposition by Francis Richards Junior again seemed to exonerate his actions.  
Humphreys personally apprehended the claimed fugitive at Tampa Bay (a dangerous 
region including the most militant blacks and Indians), returned him to Fort King, and 
secured him to the Agency house with a chain until his delivery could be made.  In that 
time, however, the slave forced the chain from his neck and escaped.  Humphreys again 
personally pursued the fugitive back south for ten days, returning successfully and 
proceeded directly to the blacksmith, where he had the slave shackled in custom made 
handcuffs and ankle chains, directly to the Agency foundation.  Yet again, with the help 
of an Indian Negro, John escaped.  “The deponent has reason to believe,” Richards 
concluded, “and does verily believe that the Agent made use of his best exertions, to have 
the said Negro so secured, as that he might be delivered to his owner.”232  
Adair narrowed the next grouping of complaints into a second general charge: that 
Humphreys failed to give necessary assistance to citizens in enabling them to recover 
their property.  And he did so, the complaint continued, in order that he may affect the 
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purchase of the same slaves at discounted rates for his own use.  That charge, Adair 
declared, was “no better sustained.”  The deposition of Waters Smith was the only one 
taken, and was simply wrong.  Smith, Adair noted, while being a seemingly upstanding 
citizen, must not have been aware that the slaves he claimed were being withheld had 
already been delivered.  The depositions of others had proven it.  In addition, there was a 
positive refusal in the instance of Zephaniah Kingsley’s accusation to even recognize his 
earlier statements.  Kingsley had settled his affair with the agent and wanted nothing to 
do with the investigation.  Evidence gathered in support of these statements included 
depositions by three army regulars stationed at Fort King: a surgeon, Lieutenant, and 
Captain.233 
Also included in the charge were William Everett’s allegations, contained in a 
copy of his original complaint to Governor DuVal, dated September 1828.  Everett 
protested to DuVal of Humphreys’ continued refusal to deliver his slaves, while seeking, 
Everett argued, to purchase them outright for his own benefit.  These accusations, Adair 
countered, were “predicated upon a Volunture[sic], Exparty[sic], affidavit of Wm 
Everett—strong & explicit.”  From what the investigator collected concerning the man’s 
character, “any statement coming from him should be read with caution.”  The brief 
statement made by a Mr. John Buck, whom Everett mentioned in his original accusation, 
according to Adair, contradicted his whole statement. Buck declined any meaningful 
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deposition, “out of delicacy to Everett.”  “I have little confidence,” Adair stated, “in the 
statement of either of them.”234 
The last two charges were relatively unrelated to the slave controversies.  The 
third dealt with accusations that Humphreys had contracted work to be done on the 
Agency for his own benefit, and inappropriately billed the government.  While 
depositions taken by a Mr. Nickolay Morgan, one of the contractors, seemed to prove that 
the agent had not intended to defraud the government, still the investigator added, “let 
this be admitted and yet the least that can be said.”  It was certainly an unprofessional 
way to conduct his business, according to Adair: “it would have been but little trouble for 
the Agent to have kept a regular account of the labour & materials supplied by him,” so 
that the government would have known exactly what they were paying for.235 
The fourth and last charge accused Humphreys of willfully allowing the Indians 
to roam outside their boundary, where they were accused of constantly attacking the 
surrounding settlers.  This charge, Adair noted, was obvious from his own observations, 
and yet “was admitted by the Agent.”  Humphreys, Adair stated, categorically denied 
having any sort of power to control them in that respect.  “Not knowing how far his 
authority extends,” he continued, “or what power he has, I can only state that the evil 
exists to a very great extent.”236  It seems, ironically, that these last two charges were the 
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only ones that might actually have contained evidence of impropriety on behalf of the 
Humphreys’ actions.  Yet they were unrelated to the root issue—slave claims—and it 
appears they were only preferred in an attempt to add more depth to the general 
accusations.  They were passed over briefly by the investigator, and ignored almost 
completely by Humphreys.  
Adair forwarded Humphreys’ written defense of the accusations a week later, 
which had until that time been delayed.  While nothing in the agent’s defense required a 
change in his report, the investigator noted, Humphreys certainly did have a lot to say.  
He first took exception with Adair, actually, noting “with dissatisfaction…the ex party 
manner of conducting the enquiry and the want of [precision] of charges” presented to 
him.  Adair defended the way he designed the investigation, however, noting to 
McKenney the orders he received recommending he proceed taking testimony, as well as 
his directions to reorder the accusations into general charges.237   
A formal written defense, Humphreys soon began, was not even necessary, 
considering the proceedings of the investigation and Adair’s own conclusions.  It seemed, 
at least to the agent, “poorly complimentary to the good sense of the President, and any 
thing respectful to him, to suppose, that a studied argument is necessary, to convince him, 
of the entire groundlessness of the accusations.”  They were, he spat, the “offspring of 
malevolence and cupidity; for I may safely assert, and without the fear of well grounded 
contradiction.”  There was not in the whole report, he added, one single piece of 
testimony “as would be admissible in a court of law, which goes to sustain even a single 
charge, enumerated in the catalogue of my alleged enormities.”  For not finding the initial 
necessity of a full defense, as he had earlier suggested, Humphreys enumerated his 
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complaints in a good degree of detail, assailing the investigation’s depositions one-by-
one and with determination.  Everett’s accusations were “wholly destroyed” by its 
opposing testimony, he began, being in substance “positively and unqualifiedly 
contradicted” by John Buck.  Buck’s statements, he argued, while no not made under 
oath, were “equally valid in law”—and “decidedly more to be respected”—when 
considering the ex parte statement of Everett, which it effectually canceled.  As gross as 
Everett’s statement was, it did not surprise him: “When I consider his character…I only 
wonder that his pliancy of conscience was not further used against me.”238   
Waters Smith’s deposition was no more accurate, Humphreys continued.  The 
elevated standing of the man, and the “high respect heretofore entertained” by the agent, 
made the task of completely gainsaying his statements a much more difficult one.  By 
Adair’s own investigation, however, three depositions had been taken into the accuracy 
of his accusations: from Captain Glassell, Lieutenant Newcomb, and Assistant Surgeon 
Hawkins—all army regulars posted at Fort King.  All three of those depositions, 
Humphreys added, directly contradicted Smith’s statement that the slave Sally had not 
been delivered over to her proper owners.  Smith alleged that Sally was still in the nation 
at the time his deposition had been taken, in February of 1829.  Yet, by the depositions of 
the officers at Fort King, delivery had been made in November or December of 1828—at 
least three or four months earlier—a difference he emphasized.  How under such 
circumstances, Humphreys concluded, it was possible for Smith to deny the delivery, “I 
am utterly at a loss to imagine.”  With the witnesses, he snapped, “I have now done!” 239 
                                                 
238 Humphreys to Adair, April 27, 1829, ibid.: 212-214. 
239 Adair to the Secretary of War, May 4, 1829, ibid.: 210-211; Humphreys to Adair, April 27, 1829, ibid.: 
212-214. 
  
111
Still, the agent spared no criticism in his assessment of the Department’s role.  
The ex parte, “and of course illegal” manner by which the investigation had been 
conducted, by special instruction from the Department, disgusted him.  It left him no 
doubt, “from the character this stamped upon the investigation, in its outset,” that had not 
been designed to “promote the ends and further the sacred cause of justice,” but to be 
used as an engine “to be wielded for the unhallowed purpose of gratifying personal 
dislike and advancing selfish views.”  Having said this much, he concluded, “I shall here 
leave the case to rest upon its own merits, sustained by my own consciousness of 
rectitude of purpose in the discharge of my public duties, and relying confidently for an 
entire acquittal upon the justice of my Government.” 240 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Humphreys’ Removal 
 
 
 DuVal, however, who seemed to almost personally hate Humphreys by this point, 
had long since resolved not to let the case rest “upon its own merits.”  In April 1829, 
three days before Adair had concluded and forwarded the results of his investigation to 
Washington, DuVal wrote President Jackson directly in the first of many blistering 
complaints to Washington.  Both Humphreys—who “ought long since to have been 
removed for misconduct”—and Judge Smith—“a man who was dismissed with disgrace 
from our army, as too vile to hold any command”—had been thought “pure enough” by 
the preceding administrations to gain commissions in the territory.  Remove these men, 
DuVal practically begged Jackson, “and aid us in giving a character to our Territory it 
richly deserves.”  He appealed to Old Hickory as the father of the territory, and as a 
patriot who “not one man in fifty” did not revere.  Yet nearly two-thirds of all the 
appointments made by his predecessors “were in direct opposition to the wishes of the 
people.”  The governor held no “vindictive feelings,” he assured the general.  Yet the 
honor, interest, character, and future prosperity of the territory all hinged on the changes 
that had to be made.241 
Next, DuVal began what would turn out to be a year long barrage of 
correspondence to the Department, writing Secretary of War John Eaton the same day 
Adair forwarded Humphreys’ written defense.  He had previously communicated to the 
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president, DuVal wrote, pressing him to remove Humphreys and have him superceded by 
subagent John Phagan.  The conduct of the agent was such “that I felt it my duty to bring 
him before the War Department,” yet nothing satisfactory had been decided.  DuVal was 
certain much of that had to do with Humphreys, who he accused of inducing the 
witnesses to withhold their testimony.  He had no doubt that Humphreys was continually 
purchasing slaves, had made “a sugar plantation at the agency,” and that he had gone as 
far as purchasing the land that the Agency was built on.  Most importantly, however, “I 
have never for the last two years been able to execute any of the orders issued by the War 
Department,” except those with which the agent personally agreed.  The Department 
looked to him as governor, he argued, and to have its orders enforced, which he had for 
some time “in vain attempted.”  As superintendent, DuVal had no confidence in 
Humphreys as agent, and vociferously urged his removal.242 
Humphreys soon learned of DuVal’s post to the Department, and wrote Eaton just 
over two weeks later.  It had come to his attention, that since the failure “of the 
prosecution of the investigation recently had in relation to my official acts as agent for 
the Florida Indians,” DuVal had continued to petition for his removal.  This was done, the 
agent protested, “in a manner less consistent with correct feeling [, than] to do me that 
injury with the [Goverment] which he failed of in the attack.”  He begged the Department 
not to listen.  Instead, he was leaving immediately for Washington, and hoped the 
secretary of war would await his arrival and discuss the situation personally.243  Captain 
Glassell, still the commanding officer at Fort King, also wrote Eaton on his behalf.  
Reiterating that Humphreys had left, and was en route for the purpose of consulting with 
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the Department over the charges, Glassell gave the secretary his views on the situation.  It 
was his firm belief, that could the Department delay its final decision until Humphreys 
arrived, “a different complexion would most probably be placed upon the case.”244 
DuVal, however, also kept up his brisk writing, and said everything he could to 
portray Humphreys as negatively as possible.  In a letter ostensibly illustrating his lack of 
compensation, the Governor again blamed Humphreys.  Since his residence was 
transferred to the Agency, DuVal bemoaned, the agent had “totally disregarded every 
order or direction given him,” and that rather than assisting him as superintendent, he had 
thrown countless difficulties in the way.  As a result, not only was DuVal responsible for 
executing the normal duties of a territorial governorship, but also had to compensate for 
the total “neglect and absence of the Agent.”  He was practically working both jobs, he 
argued, and deserved recompense.245 
Again, the next day, the governor complained.  In another letter over money, 
DuVal expressed his unhappiness with the agent.  Normally, territorial governors were 
given complete power over Indian affairs as superintendents, he began.  In his case, 
however, many of those powers had been taken from him and compensation withheld.  
“Whether the interests of our citizens will be promoted, by keeping the Superintendent in 
ignorance of the subject, you can determine.”  In the case of property controversies—
specifically slave property—DuVal felt slighted by the loss of his control over the claims.  
Those powers had been delegated to Humphreys, originally, and then to Judge Smith.  It 
was to the governor that the citizens looked foremost for the delivery of their property.  
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Taking yet another jab at Humphreys, he added that the Indians confided in him as well, 
“when not mislead by those whose duty it is to advise them honestly.”246 
He also enclosed further charges against Humphreys, levied by himself and 
allegedly supported by the statements of subagent Owen Marsh.  DuVal had written to 
Marsh a week previous, asking the subagent to recall whether Humphreys had withheld 
annuity, cattle, or slaves from the Indians.  “The interests of the country call for an 
explanation of the conduct of the agent,” he pressed Marsh.  He had been “severely 
censured” by numerous citizens who had slaves held by the Indians, because they 
believed he as governor had not sufficiently compelled Humphreys to have them 
delivered.  Assuring himself that Humphreys was totally at fault, he noted to Owen that 
“so far as my authority and power could extend, everything I could do, was done.”  If 
Humphreys had done anything wrong, and Marsh knew about it, he had inform DuVal, 
and the same had be reported to the Department.247   
That the agent was actively trading with the Indians, DuVal concluded to Eaton a 
week later (seeming to find the evidence he needed in Marsh’s response), “I have no 
doubt; and that he claims, and has on his plantation at the agency, slaves belonging to the 
Indians, which he has no right to hold, I am convinced.”  In addition, Humphreys also 
had cattle on the Agency property, which had supposedly been purchased and paid for by 
the Indians.  If the government overlooked the agent’s obvious and continued violation of 
Congressional intercourse laws, DuVal asserted, which prohibited any employee of the 
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Indian Office from trading with the Indians, “that moment consigns these unfortunate 
people to certain destruction.”248 
Again, not only should the agent be dismissed, but also more of the governor’s 
original powers should be reinstituted—particularly power over slave claims.  The easiest 
way to mitigate such complaints was not through the judicial system—a process in 
which, as he had already confided to McKenney, he had no faith.  Rather, with power 
properly articulated through the superintendency—in assembling the chiefs at the Agency 
together with the claimants, and having a fair investigation “of the claims on both sides” 
conducted—controversies over runaways would practically disappear.  He had done this 
once, DuVal reminded Eaton, in 1826, and “in a very short time, many slaves were given 
up with the unanimous consent of the Chiefs, and all parties were perfectly satisfied.”249 
One particular slaveholder, Davis Floyd, echoed that sentiment to Eaton in a 
seemingly independent correspondence.  Interested in “one or two claims” to slaves in the 
nation, Floyd also questioned Eaton on why the duties of the superintendent in such 
controversies had been taken away and given to Judge Smith.  “It is quite immaterial to 
me who decides upon those cases,” he wrote.  Yet, it was previously thought that 
questions regarding slaves were “regularly to be decided in the first instance by the 
Superintendent,” and then reported to the War Department; Floyd wondered why this had 
been altered.  After all, he had heard that at one time, DuVal had performed that service 
with several chiefs, “and in a few days delivered over a great many slaves to their proper 
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owners.”  Since his responsibilities had been redirected, however, “not a single case has 
been finally decided.”250 
DuVal personally took up the question again with a fourth letter to Eaton, 
addressed in June 1829.  The continued applications “I daily receive from Georgia and 
Florida on the subject of slaves” were occupying the majority of his time and attention as 
governor; again, he complained, he was under-compensated.  The “unprofitable and 
laborious duties of Superintendent” were enjoined upon him by the late administration, 
he argued, while those usually performed by territorial governors—and for which 
compensation was allowed—were taken from him and given to Judge Smith.  If the 
Judge was not being paid for this service, then it certainly was appropriate of the 
Department to avoid the expense.  But he was getting paid.  As an attorney for the 
government in slave controversies, DuVal countered, appointed to that position by the 
late administration, “I should consider his power of attorney as having legally expired.”  
Now, DuVal requested, let him again perform his own duties, “unless it shall appear that 
I am unable to do so.”  As superintendent, he should be allowed to investigate and decide 
on all disputes of property between citizens and Indians, and “where it is evident that the 
property belongs to a white person,” it should be delivered to them “by my order.”251   
Slave controversies, he reiterated, were the most numerous and pressing issue 
present in the territory.  “This single subject,” he argued, “has imposed more labor and 
difficulty on me, than any other Superintendent has encountered in the discharge of all 
other duties.”  There were now at the Agency, he added, five men currently claiming 
slaves in the nation.  That the agent was absent and in Washington did not help, yet it did 
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not surprise him.  “This, he has done so before, and business which he ought to attend to 
must await his return.”  Even when he was not absent, DuVal noted, Humphreys had not 
discharged his duties any more thoroughly.  Again he sniped: perhaps that was for the 
best—maybe “he had better be absent altogether.”252  
While the Governor withheld his venom on the subject for another seven months, 
other notable citizens continued.  One particularly harsh comment came from James 
Gadsden.  A commissioner for the Indian Office, Florida planter, and Jackson protégé, 
the Colonel soon joined in the chorus of those denouncing the agent in late 1829.  Eyeing 
the Seminoles’ emigration west, Gadsden wrote President Jackson and explained that 
power had to be projected through the Florida Agency.  That was not possible in its 
present condition.  In fact, the whole region was in turmoil.  The garrison at Fort King 
had been removed, and the territory was recoiling from the loss of its troops.  The 
Agency was of little help, it being “confided to a young man not in any way qualified for 
the office.”  Humphreys was, in the commissioner’s opinion, “not qualified for the 
station.”  He had little knowledge of the Indian character, and was the “principle source 
of most of the difficulties which have occurred with the Indians” in the region.253   
Again promising to clean up the mess left in Humphreys’ wake, DuVal next wrote 
Eaton in January of 1830, whining afresh of his position, lack of compensation, and of 
the agent generally.  Through late 1827, he reminded the Department, he had enjoyed the 
authority to decide on slave claims, and to forcibly return them if necessary.  In that time, 
he had decided over one hundred cases “to the entire satisfaction of our citizens and 
Indians,” and personally overseen some seventy slaves being delivered over to their 
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proper owners.  He again petitioned to have such responsibility restored, and adequate 
compensation included, as it was an expensive and time-consuming task.  Judge Smith 
received such compensation; DuVal asserted that he could execute the position better, 
and already deserved the extra funds.254 
Finally, in March 1830, DuVal succeeded in having Humphreys removed.  
McKenney wrote him notifying that President Jackson had, “by and with the advice of 
the Senate,” appointed John Phagan to supercede Humphreys as agent.  DuVal was to 
inform Humphreys that his Agency will have been considered terminated when he 
received the letter conveying it.255  As John Mahon had suggested, where Adair’s 
investigation did not do much to prove the culpability of Humphreys in most of his 
alleged improprieties, DuVal’s correspondences to Eaton, on the other hand, did much 
more.  A fundamental shift had taken place in the United States by that time: Andrew 
Jackson had become President.  DuVal beseeched Florida’s old conqueror to relieve the 
territory of an official who clearly did not embrace the same egalitarianism the emerging 
Democracy championed.  With Joseph White and James Gadsden joining DuVal in a sort 
of chorus censuring the agent, the criticism of Humphreys evidently reached the intensity 
necessary to pressure Jackson into action.256  The Seminoles lost a dear friend when agent 
Humphreys was removed.  He was a man, Charles Coe concluded, of “sterling qualities 
of head and heart.”257  
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Yet, even Humphreys’ removal appeared not to cool DuVal’s almost consuming 
sense of indignation.  In his sixth letter to the Department concerning the situation, he re-
accused Humphreys of purchasing slaves and cattle inappropriately from the Indians.  
This time, DuVal asserted, the Seminoles were directly complaining—certainly a new 
development if the allegations turned out to be true.  As for the slaves at least, chiefs 
reported to Phagan that the late agent continually approached them and traded for their 
slaves.  In most circumstances, DuVal emphasized, he plainly defrauded them, refusing 
even to pay them the reduced prices he originally offered.  Property so illegally obtained 
should be seized by the government, the governor asserted, and held until a proper 
investigation had been concluded.  Yet again, he added to his list of gripes the necessity 
of regaining the authority over general slave controversies he felt had been unfairly taken 
from him.  “I have never known why this business was transferred from me to the judge,” 
he protested, “since any order he may make would not be submitted to by the Indians and 
force would be required to effect.”  An order from him, on the other hand, as 
Superintendent would be executed immediately and effectually.258 
The War Department finally responded to DuVal’s repeated requests in April 
1830, when McKenney granted the governor the authority he so desperately demanded.  
The Superintendent confided to him that Judge Smith was given the authority he was 
“with no other view than to give satisfaction to the claimants who had remonstrated so 
long, and so loud, against the agent.”  If he was confident he could handle the cases, 
McKenney assured DuVal, then the Department had no problem returning that power 
into the hands of the governorship.  Secretary Eaton had already ordered Judge Smith to 
forward everything relative to the cases to the Governor; and the matter was now, the 
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Department concluded, in “your authority to act upon, and report…to the Department of 
War for any further direction which they may require.”259 
Washington also addressed Humphreys’ continued presence in the region and his 
alleged purchases of Indian property.  Any investigation DuVal might see fit in the cases 
where Indians disputed any transfer of cattle, slaves, etc., to the late agent was thereby 
authorized.  In addition, Humphreys had lately been appointed to the Office of Post 
Master at the Agency, the Secretary informed DuVal, which he held “as a pretext for 
remaining in the Indian boundary.”  The appointment was given to him out of courtesy, 
however, and apparently, he abused it.  Eaton vowed to contact the Post Master General 
about the improprieties, who would “doubtless promptly apply the proper remedy”—
presumably have him stripped of his position.  Then, DuVal was assured, “there will be 
nothing in your way to prevent [his] interference, (by the enforcement of the law if 
necessary,) with the Indians in the future.”260   
Ironically, the War Department also issued the Florida Agency the military 
assistance Humphreys had campaigned so urgently for throughout his tenure.  Agreeable 
to DuVal’s request, the commanding officer of Fort King was, under direction of the 
Secretary of War, ordered “to give the Indian agent on his written application, such aid as 
may be necessary to enable him to execute the duties required of him.”  Considering the 
ease at which Washington obliged the governor in this request, the Department’s actions 
are hard to explain.  Perhaps the newest Secretary finally recognized the need.  Perhaps, 
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on the other hand, directives were deliberately withheld late in Humphreys’ tenure—at 
least until the late agent had been successfully removed.261 
Regardless of the intentions of the Department, with Humphreys out of the 
picture, a renewed sense of power, and an Indian agent under his complete control, 
DuVal set out to clean up the messes he surely felt Humphreys left behild.  In September, 
he instructed Phagan to deliver a talk to the Indians, in which they would be notified that 
their annuity was again to be withheld, at least until they delivered the slaves claimed by 
Mary Hannay to her or her agent.  The Governor doubtless hoped Phagan would prove to 
be a much more effectual tool of the Department’s policy.  His first test—these orders, 
the governor reminded him—had “constantly been evaded” by his predecessor.  
Additionally, Phagan was also to investigate Humphreys’ possession of certain slaves 
supposedly belonging to the Indian Nelly Factor, and report back to him as soon as 
possible. 262   
Taking the course of slave claim arbitration back practically to its 1822 roots, 
DuVal then elucidated the procedure which would henceforth be used in deciding the 
controversies.  In all cases, Phagan was to be the principle investigator.  Where a citizen 
claimed slaves in the nation, it was relatively undisputed by the Indians, and the agent 
found sufficient proof that the slaves had indeed absconded, he was then ordered to exert 
all his power “and authority to have them delivered up to the owner.”  Where both a 
citizen and Indian claimed the same slaves, on the other hand, a counsel of chiefs would 
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be assembled, evidence submitted to them, and their answers reported back to DuVal, 
who would then decide.263     
The message conveying this system—and a few words over Hannay’s claim, 
which “will not be pleasant” to the ears of the Seminoles—was delivered to a delegation 
of chiefs and warriors two days later in the stern language of the new policy.  “Your 
annuity will not be paid,” the chiefs were plainly notified, “until you comply with the 
treaty, in giving up runaways from labour who are in your nation.  The Agent will report 
to me what you determine on, and I will make known the same to your Great Father.”264  
The orders of the Department, DuVal forwarded along to Secretary Eaton one week after 
the talk, “have been repeatedly evaded by the chiefs and especially the order to deliver up 
slaves claimed by Mrs. Hannay.”  He was absolutely determined to have those orders 
executed, and to that end, he had once again resorted to withholding the Indians’ annuity.  
This tactic had been previously turned to, DuVal reminded Eaton, but had been rejected 
by the previous administration.  With Jackson in the presidency, however, the governor 
doubtless considered the threat a very realistic course of action.  Should it not meet the 
views of the Department, however, “it is desirable that such directions may be given in 
relation to this subject.”265 
As Humphreys was removed from the picture, he had applied for and been turned 
down for indemnification involving the land and improvements he had invested in the 
Agency.  Still, however, he remained in the region.  He soon built a trading post just 
outside the nation, and became an outspoken opponent of emigration.266   Phagan 
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approached him over the disputed slaves allegedly under his control, arguing that they 
belonged to Davis Floyd (who earlier wrote the Secretary of War in DuVal’s defense) 
and John Garry, demanding them of the late agent.  Humphreys, however, positively 
refused to release them, with the threat “that I might take them on my own responsibility” 
Phagan reported, which he declined.  The two claimants then also declined insisting on 
the execution of the order through the Department, illustrating yet another seemingly 
fraudulent claim Humphreys intransigently refused to placate.267   
Later in 1832, both Phagan and DuVal accused him of attempting to persuade the 
Indians not to travel west.  “I am convinced,” DuVal wrote on the subject, that 
Humphreys and another man, W. George Centre, endeavored to “prejudice them against 
removing west of the Mississippi.”  DuVal had to act fast, he concluded, and travel down 
to the Agency from Tallahassee to “counteract any impressions these men have made on 
the minds of the Indians unfavorable to the views of the Government.”268  The two had 
not only attempted to persuade the Indians, but moved to indict Phagan on a number of 
charges as well.  The most interesting charges included his “unjust, oppressively, and 
arrogantly” withholding of the Indians’ annuity, and his insistence on having certain 
slaves surrendered for delivery to Davis Floyd and John Garry—the same slaves Phagan 
had unsuccessfully demanded of Humphreys months earlier.  Phagan complained of these 
charges to the secretary of war directly in July, noting that he was forced to defend 
himself not only to promote the removal of the Indians west, but to “defeat those 
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scoundrels that are trying to operate not only against the views of the government, but 
also against me.”269   
Yet, under the pressing of Delegate Joseph White, the government investigated 
Phagan on those and a catalogue of other charges.  DuVal again came to the agent’s aid, 
however, assuring the Department in the ensuing enquiry that he had ordered Phagan to 
pursue the courses he did.   He first reminded Eaton that he had forwarded his orders to 
the agent, along with his general course of action in withholding the annuity, to the 
Department for its review.  Upon hearing back that Washington did not believe it had the 
ability to authorize the withholding of annuity in such cases (again), he ordered the 
Indians be paid.  If there was any impropriety in this course, DuVal assured the secretary, 
“the responsibility rests on me and not the agent who acted in obedience to my order.”270   
Phagan was also accused of threatening the Indians with “chastisement in the case 
of their disobedience” of the order to deliver a large number of slaves demanded by 
Davis Floyd and John Garry, which Humphreys had personally refused to deliver.  
According to DuVal’s own report, a number of councils with the chiefs, which occurred 
while Humphreys was agent, had determined that the slaves indeed belonged to an Indian 
woman named Nelly Factor.  Nelly had allegedly sold that ownership to Floyd and 
others, who then ordered them surrendered into their custody.  Humphreys, although no 
longer an agent, argued that the slaves never really belonged to Factor, but to another 
Indian woman named Ann Burgess.  Burgess had never sold her right to the slaves; the 
sale made by Factor, therefore, was a forgery and illegal.  Sensing their inevitable loss, 
Humphreys then claimed himself an interested party in the slaves, by right of sale from 
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Burgess.  This action seems less consistent with Humphreys’ actual desire to acquire the 
slaves, and was most likely designed to shield the Indian party from the real threat of a 
fraudulent claim, placed under the control of an Agency which no longer considered their 
well being.  For whatever purpose, Humphreys disputed the right of agent Phagan to 
seize them under this pretense, and Floyd’s party declined any further action in having 
them seized.271  
There were several other charges made against agent Phagan which were pressed 
by Delegate White, Acting Governor Westcott, and ultimately Secretary of War Lewis 
Cass.272  While scholar Virginia Bergman Peters stated relatively bluntly that as the agent 
who replaced Humphreys, Phagan was a “rank opportunist,” Mahon seems more subtle in 
remarking that if the Indians gained an ally with Phagan, “they certainly did not get a 
more honest man.”273  Of all the charges levied against him, the ones accusing him of 
financial misconduct ultimately had him removed in 1832.  A later investigation proved 
not only that he was underpaying interpreters and other workers at the Agency, but that 
he misappropriated annuity payments and embezzled money from the Office—ironically, 
one of the same accusations he and DuVal pressed on Humphreys shortly after he was 
removed.274 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Beginning in 1822, the Agency was almost continually engaged in a struggle to 
assist in the development of the Florida frontier.  Possibly, more than with any other 
region of the south, its richly fertile fields came with tremendous difficulty to planter-
emigrants.  The territory’s earliest legislators had struggled to enact a code which 
disenfranchised the blacks legitimately freed under Spanish rule, and sought to have their 
plantations guarded from runaways or uprisings with the most preemptory of measures.  
To achieve that security, planters sought to have black settlements destroyed, and 
Seminole communities isolated.  Most importantly, they sought to have runaways seized 
and returned.  These measures had all been frustrated by Humphreys—an agent who did 
not weigh those priorities as heavily as protecting the sovereignty of the Seminoles under 
his charge.  By the election of Andrew Jackson and the Democracy in 1828, however, the 
regions’ settlers had finally received the support they needed; Humphreys, who clearly 
did not share its views, was replaced.   
In the wake of Phagan’s removal, Wiley Thompson was tapped for the Agency 
position in 1833.  With his appointment as the third agent in ten years, and with the 
assumption of his duties in December, the backwards slide of the Florida Agency seemed 
finally to have begun reversing.  A Georgia native, militia commander and general, and 
longtime Congressman, Thompson was a highly respected leader, and was doubtless 
valued by Washington.  The Indians revered him as well, acting Governor Westcott 
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confided, “and much advantage is anticipated from his appointment.”275  With his 
commission, however, the most ironic conclusion can now be made to the tenure of Gad 
Humphreys.  It comes with the development of the Agency moving through the Treaty of 
Payne’s landing in 1832, and the run-up to war in the early 1830s.  The controversies 
which had Humphreys removed did not subside—instead, they intensified.  In addition, 
the maturity of Thompson’s views as an agent bore striking similarities to Humphreys’.  
More than any other circumstance, perhaps, they rectify Humphreys’ troubled career at 
the Agency—particularly his opinions regarding slave policy. 
Ushering forth those views was Richard K. Call, rehashing an old controversy 
when he wrote the President in 1835 regarding citizens’ ability to purchase slaves of 
numerous Indians.  Several had done so and personally, Call had no problem with the 
notion.  If there was no objection to the purchase, “and I presume there can be none,” he 
added, there was “no measure” which promised so much towards their removal west.  
The slaves had great influence over the Indians, he argued.  Through the 1830s, in fact, 
they had developed into the most alarming setback in having the Seminoles relocated.  If 
the Indians were permitted to “convert them into specie,” one great obstacle in the way of 
that removal “may be overcome.”  The Attorney General agreed, and soon Andrew 
Jackson personally endorsed the course.276   
At least Humphreys, in 1826, had supported the idea.  The newest agent, on the 
other hand, clearly did not.  And, with a defiance striking similar to Humphreys’, the new 
agent recoiled against the idea with a surprising aggressiveness.  He particularly 
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emphasized the slaves’ relationships with the Indians, noting in it “the true cause of the 
abhorrence of these negroes of even the idea of any change.”  With this relationship in 
mind, with an “indulgence so extended by the owner to the slave,” Thompson forcibly 
asserted, it was obvious to anyone “that an Indian would almost as soon sell his child as 
his slave,” except, perhaps, when drunk.  Personally, he continued, as agent he had 
assured both the Indians and blacks that their movement west would be the safest 
recourse for both parties, and the best way to continue their coexistence.  As a result, he 
declared, he had refused to permit anyone to buy or sell any slave, “unless it be clearly 
dictated by humanity,” and he would continue that policy.277   
In an impressive outburst of indignity over Washington’s enthusiasm, Thompson 
continued his scathing disapproval of the administration’s suggested change in policy.  
They existed in “relative ease and comparable freedom,” he stressed, also forcefully 
reiterating that to secure a continuance of that relationship was the primary reason he had 
urged them to remove west in the first place.  “I should feel that I was accessory to the 
enslaving a freeman if I were to permit the sale of one or more of them in favor of the 
views of those who, for their own aggrandizement, may wish to purchase.”  With the 
most respectful deference to the department, he concluded, any other course would 
amount to “an abandonment of the principles of the treaty and of humanity.”278 
He continued voicing his extreme disapproval to the acting secretary of war two 
months later.  The Department recognized the blacks’ influence with the Indians, he 
claimed.  It doubtless also understood their “undeniable abhorrence” to the idea of being 
transferred out of the territory and onto sugar plantations.  Those views were, after all, the 
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primary reason the Indians had originally resolved not to emigrate.  He had worked 
tirelessly to persuade them otherwise, personally assuring both the Indians and blacks 
that they would be transferred together, and protected from the Creeks.  Surely then, 
Thompson sourly concluded—in light of these assurances, it would be more 
conscientious of the government to see to the “punctilious redemption of those pledges,” 
rather than to proceed in “classing them with the Indian skins and furs.”  He was 
ashamed, the agent reiterated, that his views should differ so fundamentally from those of 
the government—views which “I verily believe so deeply involved principles of 
humanity, justice, and an enterprise for the success of which, standing in relation which I 
do to the government and these people, I am more responsible, perhaps, than any other 
person.”279  Jackson finally, in July of 1835, recommended a prohibition on having 
citizens buy slaves—at least unless permitted by the agent.280  
In another almost entertaining reappearance, Archibald Clark again began 
petitioning to have the claims of Mary Hannay attended to, almost seven years after he 
first approached Humphreys.  He furnished McKenney with one of these original 
correspondences—an order from the secretary of war to Humphreys, dated March of 
1828—which demanded that Humphreys deliver the slaves claimed by Mary Hannay.  
Clark now alerted McKenney that he was ready “to comply with the above-recited 
requisition.”281   
Thompson, however, took a few exceptions with the suggestion.  First, the Treaty 
of Payne’s Landing, concluded in 1832, dealt specifically with the issue of slave claims.  
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In article six, it provided for compensation to be provided by the government in cases of 
disputed slave claims, as to relieve the Indians from the “repeated vexatious demands for 
slaves and other property alleged to have been stolen and destroyed by them,” and speed 
their removal west.  It seemed clear to Thompson that Clark’s claim fell under that 
provision; if the Department should take up the issue, it would be to decide on a 
monetary adjustment, not to seize property.  Far more ironic, however, Thompson added 
that as far as he had read the enclosed evidence, Hannay had no title to the claimed 
slaves.  Nothing supported Clark’s assertions.  On the other hand, an affidavit from a Mr. 
Wanton—whose credibility, Thompson confided, was supported by himself and General 
Duncan Clinch—directly contradicted her claim.  “I am therefore still of the opinion,” he 
concluded, “that Mrs. Hannay has no equitable right to the negroes in question.”282   
How surprising.  In the five years since Humphreys was removed, the very same 
controversy was an irritating presence at the Agency and in the Florida territory.  What is 
most interesting, then, is that practically the very same agent was in control, and 
defending his native charges in the very same ways.  Who knows what would have 
happened to Agent Thompson.  With views akin to those of Humphreys, he had most 
certainly placed himself in a similar trajectory.  Yet, that never happened.  Thompson 
was gunned down by Osceola after dinner on December 28, 1835, as he strode around the 
Agency palisade with Lieutenant Constantine Smith—one of the two simultaneous 
actions, along with the massacre of Dade’s command, recognized as the commencement 
of the Second Seminole Indian War.283 
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A conflict heavily participated in by black warriors, the war soon became 
recognized as having been initiated over the expansion of slavery into the Florida 
frontier.  As Major General Thomas S Jesup famously suggested only a year into the 
struggle: “This, you may be assured, is a negro, not an Indian war; and if it be not 
speedily put down, the south will feel the effects of it on their slave population before the 
end of the next season.”284  Yet the prewar years, examined here through the 1822-1830 
Indian Agency and through Gad Humphreys, illustrate that same cause fermenting almost 
a decade previous.  
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